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Abstract
Banks provide not one but two vital services. Bank deposits are the pre-
ferred form of safe assets used for transactions, and bank loans allow busi-
nesses to undertake risky endeavors. However, this creates a tension in bank
business: deposit-holders require safety for bank liabilities to be liquid; while
loan-holders want the freedom to take profitable business risks. A widely-used
policy to guarantee the liquidity of bank deposits is the government provision
of deposit insurance. This thesis considers some of the relative benefits and
costs of deposit insurance relative to an alternative of ‘narrow banking’. This
policy argues that a single bank liability structure cannot optimally provide
both liquidity and credit. Instead, these two services should be provided by
separate entities. These entities could share an owner, provided the safe ‘nar-
row’ business can be credibly ring-fenced from the risky ‘wide’ bank. Narrow
banks issue safe, short-term, debt which can be used for transactions and
are invested solely in safe assets so as not to necessitate insurance. To pre-
vent runs, we suggest that wide banks issue longer-term equity contracts to
fund risky business credit. Savers are informed of risks up-front and updated
through regular markings-to-market. This thesis considers the ability of a
narrow banking system to provide liquidity and credit.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
We introduce and motivate the class of problems considered in this
thesis and survey the relevant economics literature
At the end of their seminal book on bank regulation (Dewatripont, Tirole,
et al. (1994)), the authors lay down a challenge for future research. As de-
posit insurance reduces incentives for savers to monitor bank risk, what would
happen if insurance were restricted to only cover safe assets? This is a sys-
tem known as narrow banking1 – in contrast with the dominant policy2 of
‘blanket’ coverage which does not restrict how insured deposits are invested.
That the question remains unanswered speaks to the many facets that must
be considered. A major challenge is the central role that banks play in the
provision of both liquidity and credit. Both services link banks to the real
economy – an area that has received intense attention since the Global Finan-
cial Crisis (GFC). Morley (2016) provides an excellent summary of the vast
literature that has emerged. However, discussion of changes to the scope of
deposit insurance has been limited, with notable exceptions from King (2016);
Lilico (2010); Dowd (2013); Calomiris and Haber (2014) and Kotlikoff (2010).
1First suggested by Fisher (1935), as ‘the Chicago Plan’, narrow banking has been
supported by many economists (Hart (1935); Tobin (1987); Friedman (1960)) and is enjoying
a recent resurgence (Kay et al. (2010); Benes and Kumhof (2012); Pennacchi (2012)).
2Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven (2014) document the geographic scope and extent
of deposit insurance worldwide.
1
2Naturally, there is variation in opinion on the optimal alternative policy.3
Regulatory change – especially for policies which directly connect savers to
bank risks4 – requires a burden of proof in the form of a substantial literature.
This thesis takes a general stance on the form of the alternative system and is
most concerned with providing theoretical results for a policy regime in which
deposit insurance is restricted or removed completely. In particular, we focus
on the ability for such a system to provide liquidity and credit.
Holmstrom (2015) defines a liquid asset as one that can be sold at face-
value ‘no questions asked’ (NQA). Such assets are useful for transactions and
trade with a liquidity premium (Stein (2012); Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2012)). Chapter 2 focuses directly on liquidity provision in a simple
micro-theory framework where banks can choose to exert monitoring effort
to improve loan quality. We show that, relative to deposit insurance, the
government can provide commensurate liquid assets by issuing government
debt directly to narrow banks. In terms of lending, deposit insurance provides
the highest quantity of loans but of a lower quality, relative to the case of
narrow banking.
Townsend (1979) models the agency problem between a bank and an en-
treprenerial borrower, where the entrepreneur has incentive to falsify returns.
Chapter 3 uses an overlapping generations model to consider the same prob-
lem between savers and the bank. The long generational time-frame abstracts
from liquidity issues thus this Chapter can be understood as focusing on the
3Miron (2010) and Dowd (1992, 2013) come from a libertarian stance prefering a fully
free-market solution, while King (2016) provides a transitional policy ceding greater power
to the central bank. Kay et al. (2010) would allow narrow banks to invest in residential
mortgages. Kotlikoff (2010) and Cochrane (2014) restate the policy of Jacklin (1989) of
using equity-funded banking. Pennacchi (2012) points out the equity suffers from ‘cream-
skimming’ (Gorton and Pennacchi (1990)) and the traditional definition of a narrow banking
system which provides debt layered on government bonds is preferable for transactions.
4Another cause for concern is the re-introduction of ‘sunspot’ bank runs as in Diamond
and Dybvig (1983). Jacklin (1989) and Dowd (2000) point out runs are a problem linked to
insufficient capitalization.
3‘wide’ sector of a narrow-wide banking system. We note the problems in charg-
ing actuarially fair insurance premia (Leonard (2013); Chan, Greenbaum, and
Thakor (1992)) and assume that, in a crisis, government funds are necessary
to ensure depositors are repaid in full. We show that if these funds are instead
spent preventing the “cream-skimming” problem with equity savings contracts
(Gorton and Pennacchi (1990)) then equity-funded banking can provide signif-
icant welfare improvements. Using government funds to promote bank disclo-
sure contrasts with the proposal in Dang, Gorton, Holmstro¨m, and Ordon˜ez
(2017) who argue that bank opacity is necessary for liquidity. We point out
that government debt is an ample source of safe liquid assets for transactions.
Opacity creates hard-to-measure risk. It is far simpler for governments to au-
dit a transparent banking sector than a deliberately over-complicated one. We
also consider investor -funded ratings unions but these suffer from the para-
dox that costly information suffers from free-riding (Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980)).
It is common for large industries to extract government assistance when
hit with potentially catastrophic losses. The scale, however, of assistance
given to banks following the crisis was extraordinary. Chapter 4 attempts to
quantify the real cost of bank recapitalization in the US and UK. Contrary to
Treasury reports, our figures include inflation and the effect of Quantitative
Easing on government costs of borrowing incurred from funding the emergency
recapitalization of banks. The key finding is that differences in the treatment
of equity-holders of recipient banks changed the outcome of the programes.
The treatment of equity-holders of receipient banks was not consistent. In the
UK, Northern Rock’s shareholders received no compensation when the bank
was nationalized, while the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Bank suffered
no dilution despite the government taking a majority stake in each company.
In the USA, all profits from Government Sponsored Enterprises – Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac – are transferred to the government, at the expense of its
4shareholders. Without this ruling, the headline result that the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP) was profitable disappears. All other recipients were
not subject to this ongoing profit transfer. Other differences between the
two countries result from the lessons that the US regulators learned from
the UK programme. Chiefly, US regulators mandated that recipient banks
issue warrants so the taxpayer benefitted from capital gains. Secondly, the
US program was able to corral a large number of healthier banks to join the
program, which raised average returns. The UK results are dominated by the
large losses which will result from the eventual sale of the government’s stake
in the Royal Bank of Scotland.
Chapters 2 to 4 form the core of the present thesis. Chapter 2 is based on a
paper co-authored with George Pennacchi. Chapter 3 is based on a paper co-
authored with Lawrence Kotlikoff. Chapter 4 is based on a paper co-authored
with Huw Dixon. Chapter 5 concludes.
Chapter 2
How Should Governments
Create Liquidity?
Governments can create safe, liquid assets by issuing government
debt or by insuring private debt, such as bank deposits. Yet this
public liquidity creation is limited by the government’s capacity to
raise taxes to pay its liabilities. This paper analyzes the effects
of safe asset creation in a financial system where individuals es-
pecially value default-free assets. It compares a banking system
with fairly-priced deposit insurance to banking systems with both
uninsured “broad” banks and “narrow” banks which invest only in
government debt. We find that a system with deposit insurance
maximizes the amount of bank system lending but leads to less ef-
ficient monitoring of bank borrowers. The alternative system with
narrow and broad banks produces the same amount of government
safe assets but more privately-created “quasi-safe” assets.
2.1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the design of a country’s banking system when its govern-
ment’s taxing capacity limits the amount of safe assets that can be created.
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6A government can provide safe (default-free) assets by insuring bank deposits
or by directly issuing government debt, such as Treasury bills. Yet it can do
so only to a limited degree. A government’s total liabilities are constrained
by the amount of taxes that it can raise from its citizens.
We compare a system where the government provides limited deposit in-
surance to banks that make risky loans versus a system where the government
requires that narrow banks invest only in the government’s directly issued
debt (Treasury bills) and uninsured “broad” banks make risky loans. In both
systems, safe assets may be created by the government but “quasi-safe” assets
can also be created privately. The distinction between government safe assets
and private quasi-safe assets is that the former are fully default-free while the
latter are default-free except during a severe financial crisis or “catastrophe.”
Individuals are willing to pay “liquidity” premiums to invest in safe assets,
where the premium is greater for fully-safe assets compared to quasi-safe as-
sets. Because individuals especially value liquidity, they accept lower rates of
return on safe assets relative to the certainty-equivalent return on risky assets.
The banks in our model are local and separated, with similarities to the
‘islands’ models developed in Lucas Jr (1972, 1975), such that interbank net-
work effects are precluded. Our model assumes that banks can improve the
returns on their risky loans by costly monitoring of their borrowers. How-
ever, monitoring is not contractible so that the bank’s owner-manager must
be given incentives to monitor efficiently. Because the bank owner has limited
liability, the bank’s choice of leverage (deposit-to-equity capital ratio) affects
its incentive to monitor. A bank that limits its leverage can signal its incentive
to efficiently monitor, which can raise the bank’s firm value and potentially
lower its cost of deposit funding. Because monitoring costs are assumed to
vary across banks, in general some lower-cost banks may limit leverage and
0Compared to deposit-insured banks, uninsured broad banks might be considered a type
of “shadow” bank.
7efficiently monitor while other higher-cost banks choose high leverage and do
not monitor. Our model also permits a bank to issue deposits with different
seniorities, a process referred to as “tranching.” For some banks, issuing both
senior and junior deposits can be profitable because the former can be made
quasi-safe.
We use the model to investigate three regimes: a baseline, fully-private
banking system with no government safe assets; a scheme of fairly-priced
government deposit insurance; and a system combining narrow banks that
invest in government debt and uninsured broad banks that make loans. We
assume the tax base available to finance a government’s safe assets is identical
in the latter two regimes to allow for a fair comparison.
We show that the creation of safe assets that derives from the government’s
ability to impose future taxes can potentially improve welfare by providing
more and higher-quality liquidity. However, government safe asset production
can come at the cost of less-efficient bank monitoring or less total bank lending.
Government deposit insurance is profitable for banks because deposits that
are completely safe, even during a catastrophe, are especially valued by savers
and require the lowest risk-adjusted rate of return. However, sufficiently high
levels of deposit insurance reduce the amount of efficient monitoring in the
banking system and can crowd out quasi-safe deposits.
In a system with narrow banks and uninsured broad banks, narrow banks
that take deposits and invest in government debt may, in some structures,
reduce the deposits available to broad banks that make loans. As a conse-
quence, banking system lending can decline. However, because fewer deposits
limit the leverage of broad banks, the lending that does occur tends to be done
with more efficient monitoring and possibly greater production of quasi-safe
deposits. However, under a different narrow bank - broad bank structure,
8narrow banks would not reduce deposits available to broad banks and would
be equivalent to a system of fully-private lending banks but with the benefit
of additional government safe assets.
Our paper contributes to a literature on the private and public provision of
safe assets.1 Prior research, including Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) and Dang,
Gorton, Holmstro¨m, and Ordon˜ez (2017), notes that safe assets are especially
valuable for making transactions due to their information-insensitivity. The
“money-like” feature of safe assets can allow them to pay a lower rate of return
compared to riskier, less-liquid assets. Such a liquidity premium is empirically
documented by work including Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012),
Sunderam (2015), and Nagel (2016).
Research shows that safe assets can be created privately via financial insti-
tutions such as banks (e.g., Diamond (2017)) or special purpose vehicles that
invest in risky debt and issue tranched securities (e.g., DeMarzo and Duffie
(1998) and DeMarzo (2005)). However, safe assets can also be created by gov-
ernments in the form of sovereign debt or by insuring privately-issued debt,
such as bank deposits (e.g., Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2015), He, Kr-
ishnamurthy, and Milbradt (2018), Gatev and Strahan (2006), and Pennacchi
(2006)).
Most papers that analyze the co-existence of private and public safe assets
concentrate on issues related to financial stability. Research by Holmstro¨m
and Tirole (1998), Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman (2009), and Stein (2012)
present models where the provision of government safe, liquid assets can im-
prove financial system stability relative to an economy with only private liquid
assets.
Our paper also analyzes the interaction between private and public safe
1See Gorton (2017) for an in-depth review of this literature.
9assets, but our focus relates to issues of lending efficiency and the aggregate
volume of private safe assets. As in Diamond (1984), banks in our model can
create value by making loans and providing costly monitoring of borrowers.
We study how the form of government safe assets affects monitoring efficiency
and private liquidity creation. Our paper’s main contribution is to show that
public safe assets in the form of government-insured deposits can have differ-
ent implications compared to public safe assets in the form of directly-issued
government debt. They have different effects with regard to a banking sys-
tem’s aggregate lending, its lending efficiency, and its creation of private safe
assets.
The next section introduces our basic model and considers a fully-private
banking system with no role for government. Section 3 examines a banking
system with government deposit insurance that is limited by the government’s
capacity to tax agents’ future wages in order pay insurance losses. Section 4
considers a banking system where the government directly issues debt that is
held by narrow banks that operate like “Treasury-only” money market mutual
funds. In this system, uninsured broad banks make loans. As with deposit
insurance, the amount of government debt that can be issued is limited by the
government’s future taxing capacity. Section 5 provides numerical illustrations
of the model’s results, and Section 6 briefly discusses the robustness of the
model’s assumptions. Conclusions are given in Section 7.
2.2 Liquidity Creation in a Fully-Private Banking
System
This section presents our basic model of a private banking system that has
no role for a government to create safe assets. Private banks can create only
quasi-safe assets, which are default-free except in a financial catastrophe. The
following sections will consider how a government can create fully default-free
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assets due to its ability to tax individuals’ future endowments.
Consider a single-period economy with risk-neutral agents who obtain util-
ity from their end-of-period consumption. Agents receive initial endowments
that can be transformed into end-of-period consumption using two types of
investment technologies. One is a risky investment technology that is available
to all agents. The other is a superior risky investment technology that can
only be accessed through lending intermediaries, which we call “banks.”
There are two types of agents: agents who are capable of owning and
managing banks and other agents who wish to save and value liquidity derived
from investing in safe assets. We will refer to the former agents as “bankers”
and the latter agents as “savers.” Each banker has a fixed beginning-of-period
endowment of inside equity equal to k. A banker can raise additional funds in
the form of deposits from its local savers who can deposit only in their local
bank.2 We normalize the maximum amount of available local savings to 1 and
the amount of total deposits actually issued by the bank is denoted by γ ≤ 1.
Therefore, a bank’s beginning-of-period assets equals (γ + k) ≤ (1 + k).3
Banks are special due to their superior lending technology that funds iden-
tical projects in perfectly elastic supply. All projects, and therefore loans, are
subject to only aggregate (macroeconomic) risk.4 We consider three end-of-
period states of the world: ‘good,’ ‘bad,’ and ‘catastrophe.’ The good state
occurs with probability pg, in which case each loan’s end-of-period return per
unit lent equals its promised return of RL. The bad state occurs with prob-
ability pb, in which case each loan defaults but has a positive recovery value.
2Savers are limited to investing only in the bank’s debt (deposits) and not its equity.
In richer models where savers cannot verify the return on the bank’s assets or have needs
to trade, they may prefer bank deposits relative to bank equity. For example, see Diamond
(1984); Townsend (1979); Gorton and Pennacchi (1990).
3As will become clear, a banker has the incentive to invest the entire amount of capital,
k, in the bank because of its access to a superior investment technology.
4We focus on macroeconomic risk because, in general, idiosyncratic risks might be di-
versified away through pooling as in Diamond (1984).
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Finally, the catastrophe state occurs with probability pc = 1 − pg − pb, in
which case the loan defaults and has a zero recovery value.
The banker is able to improve each loan’s recovery value in the bad state by
exerting beginning-of-period effort to monitor the borrower.5 This recovery
value is denoted by d(a), where a is a banker’s beginning-of-period level of
effort per unit of loan. Recovery value per unit of loan is assumed to be the
following increasing and concave function of banker effort:
d(a) = RL
(
1− αe−βa
)
(2.1)
where 0 < α < 1 and β > 0. Monitoring effort is assumed to be costly in
terms of diminishing the banker’s utility at a fixed marginal cost per unit
of effort.6 Denote Banker i’s marginal cost of effort by ci. We assume the
country’s economy has a continuum of local bankers who differ in terms of
their cost of monitoring, where ci belongs to a continuous distribution having
the range:
ci ∈ [pbβ(RL − 1), pbαβRL] ≡ [c, c¯]. (2.2)
As will be shown, this restriction on the range of monitoring costs ensures
that each bank’s first-best effort is positive but still results in a positive loss
given default. Importantly, it is also assumed that each bank’s effort level, a,
is unobservable to savers and, hence, cannot be contracted upon.
While savers are risk neutral, they have an additional ‘liquidity’ demand
for safe assets. Savers have direct access to a risky investment technology that
funds projects in perfectly elastic supply and pays a return per unit investment
of RR/pg only in the good state. Therefore, this non-intermediated investment
5We refer to this effort as monitoring, but it could also be interpreted as credit screening
to determine which loan applicants have higher recovery value.
6Alternatively, one could assume bankers differ in terms of how efficient is their effort in
improving recovery value, β.
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technology has an expected return per unit investment of RR < RL.
7 However,
savers will accept the expected return of RC < RR on an investment that is
default-free in the good and bad states but not the catastrophe state. Thus,
this ‘quasi-safe’ investment does not default with probability ℘ ≡ pg + pb and
defaults with probability pc = 1 − ℘. Examples of these investments might
include money market instruments such as A1/P1-rated commercial paper
and wholesale, uninsured bank certificates of deposit.8 Later we will consider
government-created assets that are default-free in all states for which savers
require a return that is even lower than RC . As in Stein (2012), we assume
that savers’ required return on quasi-safe assets is independent of their supply.
We can define a quasi-safe asset’s liquidity premium by l where RC(1+l) =
RR. This liquidity premium can be considered a utility bonus due to a safe
asset’s value in settling transactions and for use as collateral.9
Because loans return zero in the catastrophe state, the best that a private
bank can do is to create quasi-safe deposits. Doing so allows it to reduce
its cost of funding by the liquidity premium l. The bank can augment its
quasi-safe deposits in two ways. One way is by increasing the recovery value
of its loans in the bad default state by efficiently monitoring its borrowers.
However, for depositors to find this credible, the bank must have an incentive
to undertake this unobserved action. The bank can create this incentive by
restricting its leverage so that bank equity receives the marginal benefit from
its costly monitoring effort.
7These projects may be the same types of projects that banks fund with loans. However,
savers are not able to monitor borrowers and obtain inferior expected returns relative to those
received by banks.
8This asset class might be considered a ‘near-money’ or what Moreira and Savov (2014)
refer to as ‘shadow money.’
9Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) provide a theory for why safe assets are particularly
valuable for transactions. Several recent models, such as Stein (2012), assume that the
moneyness feature of safe short-term gives it a lower required return than the certainty-
equivalent return on risky assets.
13
The second way that a bank might increase its quasi-safe deposits is by
“tranching” its debt, which means that it issues both senior deposits and
junior deposits (or subordinated debt). Designed appropriately, the senior
deposits can be made quasi-safe and supported by the additional assets that
are funded by junior deposits. We defer consideration of tranching until the
next section. For now, we assume that the bank issues only a single class of
deposits of the amount γ.
Bankers are assumed to be the only equity investors (shareholders) of the
bank. Their profit-maximizing choice of leverage and effort may result in
savers’ deposits being either quasi-safe or default-risky. We now consider the
possible equilibrium behavior of these limited-liability bankers and savers.
An equilibrium is defined as follows. First, a bank(er) announces that it
will raise γ ≤ 1 in deposits, so that its total assets equals γ+k. Second, given
this choice of leverage (deposits and total assets), the bank’s promised return
on deposits, RD, is set. Third, given this deposit rate, the bank chooses its
unobserved effort level, a. An equilibrium is a choice of γ and a that maximizes
the bank’s profits and a promised deposit rate RD that satisfies depositors’
participation constraint given the bank’s announced γ and its equilibrium
profit-maximizing choice of a.
Since Bank i has monitoring cost ci, its profit maximization problem can
be characterized as:
max
γ,a
pg [(γ + k)RL − γRD]+pb max [(γ + k)d(a)− γRD, 0]−cia(γ+k) (2.3)
subject to the constraint that its deposits cannot exceed 1:
γ ≤ 1 (2.4)
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and subject to depositors’ participation constraint:
RD ≥

RR−pb γ+kγ d(a∗)
pg
if (γ + k)d(a∗) < γRC/℘
RC/℘ otherwise
(2.5)
Note that the expected profits given in (2.3) reflect the fact that the bank may
or may not default in the bad state but will always default in the catastrophe
state due to loans’ zero recovery value in that state. Also, the depositors’
participation constraint (2.5) reflects either default in the bad state (the first
line on the right-hand side) or no default in the bad state (the second line on
the right-hand side). In the former case, depositors’ required expected return
is RR, but in the latter case it is RC since deposits are quasi-safe.
The solution to the problem can be found by noting that whenever default
occurs in the bad state, (γ + k)d(a∗) < γRC/℘, then from the objective
function (2.3) we see that the banker receives no benefit from monitoring and
the bank’s private effort choice will be a∗ = al ≡ 0. Deposits’ equilibrium
promised return must then be RD =
RR−pb γ+kγ d(al)
pg
=
RR−pb γ+kγ RL(1−α)
pg
and
the bank’s expected profit is
pil = pg[(γ + k)RL − γRD] = (γ + k)[pgRL + pbRL(1− α)]− γRR. (2.6)
Instead, whenever (γ + k)d(a∗) > γRC/℘ so that the banker obtains a return
in the default state, then its optimal choice of effort will either be the same
corner solution al = 0 or the effort level implied by the first-order condition:
∂d(a)
∂a
=
ci
pb
. (2.7)
By substituting in the functional form for d(a) from equation (2.1), the effort
satisfying this first order condition is a∗ = ah where
ah ≡ 1
β
ln
(
βαpbRL
ci
)
(2.8)
which results in the loan’s bad state recovery value equaling
d(ah) = RL − ci
βpb
(2.9)
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In this case deposits are quasi safe, RD = RC/℘, and the high-effort bank’s
expected profit is
pih = (γ + k)
[
pgRL + pbd(a
h)− ciah
]
− γRC (2.10)
where pbd(a
h) − ciah > pbRL(1 − α) is the expected recovery value net of
monitoring costs. Thus, al = 0 or ah given by equation (2.8) are the only
choices of effort that could possibly be profit-maximizing for the bank. The
following lemma states that a bank’s profit-maximizing choice of effort, and
its equilibrium deposit interest rate, depends on whether its initial choice of
leverage is below or above a particular threshold value which we refer to as
γm.
Lemma 1. If Bank i chooses initial deposits less than or equal to γm(ci) ≡
k pbd(a
h)−ciah
RC/℘−(pbd(ah)−ciah) , then the equilibrium is one where the bank supplies first-
best effort (2.8), RD = RC/℘, and has profits equal to equation (2.10). If it
chooses initial deposits exceeding γm(ci), the equilibrium is characterized by
no bank effort, RD =
RR−pb γ+kγ RL(1−α)
pg
, and profits equal to equation (2.6).
The proof in given in Appendix A. Thus, the profit function is given by
equations (2.6) and (2.10), where the switch point occurs at γ = γm. The
bank’s profit maximizing choice of γ is then the maximum of this profit func-
tion. As both profit functions, (2.6) and (2.10), are linear and increasing in γ,
these maxima are at the endpoints, γ = γm and γ = 1 respectively.10 Banks
simply compare profits at
pil =(1 + k) [pgRL + pbd(0)]−RR (2.11)
pih =(γm + k)
[
pgRL + pbd(a
h)− ciah
]
− γmRC (2.12)
and choose the (γ, a) combination (γm, ah) if pil ≤ pih and otherwise choose
(1, 0).
10We rule out parameter values for which profit is decreasing in γ since that implies that
banks choose to issue zero deposits.
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Now note from (2.11) and (2.12) that pil does not depend on the banker’s
cost of effort, since no effort is expended. Moreover, pih is a monotonically
decreasing function of the banker’s cost, ci.
11 Assuming that
pih(c¯) < pil < pih(c), (2.13)
then there exists a unique c∗ that is the value of c such that pil = pih. It
satisfies the implicit equation:
c∗ =
pilpb(RL −RC/℘)(
1
β + a
h(c∗)
)
(pil − pgkRC/℘)
(2.14)
where ah(c∗) = 1β ln
(
βαpbRL
c∗
)
. This logic leads to the following proposition
that is proven in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. If Bank i’s cost of monitoring is ci < c
∗, it chooses leverage
equal to γm(ci), provides first best effort of a
h(ci), sets RD = RC/℘, and
has profits equal to equation (2.12). Instead, if its cost is ci > c
∗, it chooses
γ = 1, provides no effort, sets RD =
RR−pb(1+k)RL(1−α)
pg
, and has profits equal
to equation (2.11).
Thus, only low monitoring cost banks, defined as having ci < c
∗, limit
leverage, provide first-best effort, and create quasi-safe deposits.
Our results to this point assume that a bank issues only one class of de-
posits. The next section considers whether a bank might choose to issue both
senior deposits and junior (subordinated) deposits. Interestingly, the process
of tranching deposits can permit issuance of quasi-safe deposits by high-cost,
no-effort banks.
2.2.1 Tranching
Consider a bank that offers two classes of deposits: senior deposits and junior
deposits (or subordinated debt). Suppose that the bank restricts the amount
11See the proof in Appendix A.
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of its senior deposits, γs, such that it has sufficient loan recovery value in the
bad default state to pay off senior depositors in full. Intuitively, the bank
may have an incentive to do so because it ensures that senior deposits are
quasi-safe and their promised return is relatively low at RC/℘. In addition,
let the amount of junior deposits be γj and their promised return be RD,j .
For an equilibrium effort level, a, the amount of senior, quasi-safe debt that
the bank could issue, γs, will satisfy:
(γs + γj + k)d(a) ≥ γsRC/℘ (2.15)
or, equivalently, senior leverage must be below a maximum, γ¯s, which is in-
creasing in effort, a, and other forms of bank funding, γj + k,
γs ≤ γ¯s ≡ (γ
j + k)d(a)
RC/℘− d(a) . (2.16)
The bank’s profit maximization problem is now characterized as:
max
γj ,γs,a
pg
[
(γs + γj + k)RL − γsRC/℘− γjRD,j
]
(2.17)
+pb max
[
(γs + γj + k)d(a)− γsRC/℘− γjRD,j , 0
]− ca(γs + γj + k)
subject to the constraint (2.15) that senior deposits are quasi-safe and subject
to junior depositors’ participation constraint:
RD,j ≥

RR− pbγj [(γ
s+γj+k)d(a∗)−γsRC/℘]
pg
if (γs + γj + k)d(a∗)− γsRC/℘ < γjRC/℘
RC/℘ otherwise
(2.18)
To solve this problem, let us start by considering the bank’s incentive to
exert effort. Note that bank equity benefits from effort only if it receives the
marginal profit from effort in the bad default state. That can only occur when
(γs + γj + k)d(a)− γsRC/℘− γjRD,j > 0. (2.19)
But if inequality (2.19) holds, then junior deposits are also quasi-safe, can be
paid a deposit interest rate of RD = RC/℘, and are no different from senior
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deposits. Consequently, a bank that monitors at first best, a∗ = ah, cannot
benefit from issuing more than one class of (senior) deposits. Thus, if a bank
has a relatively low cost of exerting effort so that its optimal effort choice is
first-best, then optimal effort, leverage, and profits are {ah, γm, pih}, the same
as when it does not tranche.
Instead, consider a bank that has relatively high monitoring costs such that
it is optimal not to exert effort and inequality (2.19) does not hold. Without
tranching, Proposition 1 shows that this bank would choose maximum lever-
age, γ = 1, and all deposits suffer losses in the bad default state. Consequently,
the bank’s per unit expected cost of deposit funding is RR. Tranching now
allows the bank to reduce part of its deposit funding costs. Since quasi-safe
senior deposits have the lower per unit expected cost of RC < RR while the
expected cost of junior deposits is unchanged at RR, the bank has the incen-
tive to issue the maximum amount of quasi-safe senior deposits, γs = γ¯s. As a
result, junior deposits receive nothing in the bad state so that their promised
return is RD,j =
RR
pg
.12
Since a bank that chooses no effort, al = 0, profits by maximizing to-
tal leverage, γ = 1, even when it does not tranche its deposits, its profit-
maximizing amount of junior deposits is γj = 1 − γ¯s. Thus, tranching does
not affect this bank’s equilibrium effort or total leverage, but permits it to
create quasi-safe assets equal to
γs =
(1− γs + k)RL(1− α)
RC/℘−RL(1− α) =
(1 + k)RL(1− α)
RC/℘
(2.20)
Doing so yields increased profits as a result of the reduced funding cost of
senior deposits. Denoting the no-effort bank’s profits under tranching as pilT ,
12The fact that in equilibrium junior deposits receive nothing in the bad state makes
their payoff similar that of the banker’s inside equity, k. In this sense, junior deposits might
be considered similar to outside equity. However, the effort incentive of the banker depends
his/her inside equity, so issuing more junior deposits is not equivalent to the banker starting
with more inside equity.
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we have
pilT =pg
[
(1 + k)RL − γsRC
℘
− (1− γs)RR
pg
]
=(1 + k) [pgRL + pbRL(1− α)]− γsRC − (1− γs)RR
=(1 + k) [pgRL + (pb + ℘l)RL(1− α)]−RR, (2.21)
where recall that the liquidity premium, l, is defined by RR = (1+l)RC . Com-
pared to profits without tranching in equation (2.11), we see that tranching
raises the no-effort bank’s profits by the liquidity premium that it saves on its
quasi-safe senior deposits:
pilT − pil =℘l(1 + k)RL(1− α) = lγsRC ≥ 0.
This increase in no-effort profits alters the monitoring cost threshold above
which banks choose no effort. By equating pilT in equation (2.21) to pi
h in
equation (2.12), the critical value of ci is now:
cT =
pilT pb(RL −RC/℘)(
1
β + a
h(cT )
)
(pilT − pgkRC/℘)
. (2.22)
Since pilT > pi
l and pgkRC/℘ > 0, we see that c
T < c∗. Intuitively, tranching
deposits makes choosing no effort relatively more profitable than choosing high
effort. Hence, there is a lower cost threshold at which banks choose no effort.
We summarize these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. If Bank i’s cost of monitoring is ci < c
T , it does not benefit
from tranching and its leverage, effort, deposit rate, and profits are the same
as without tranching. Instead, if its cost is ci > c
T , it exerts no effort and
issues senior deposits of γs and junior deposits of 1 − γs where γs is given
by equation (2.20). The deposit rates of senior and junior deposits are RC/℘
and RR/pg, respectively, and the bank’s profits are given by equation (2.21).
Since, cT < c∗, more banks choose no effort when tranching is possible than
when it is not.
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It is interesting to note that if banks are not permitted to tranche deposits,
low-cost, high-effort banks are the only ones that can produce quasi-safe de-
posits. However, if tranching is permitted, now high-cost, no-effort banks
create quasi-safe deposits and, moreover, the amount that they create can
exceed that of the low-cost, high-effort banks. That is, there are parameter
values such that γs > γm(ci) for a range of ci < c
T . It may seem ironic that
high-cost banks which do not monitor and have riskier loan portfolios are able
to create more quasi-safe deposits. Of course they do so by issuing more risky
junior deposits because they need not signal their incentive to monitor by
having low total leverage. The next section considers the aggregate amount
of quasi-safe assets produced by a private, uninsured banking industry.
2.2.2 Quasi-Safe Asset Production
The provision of quasi-safe, liquid assets may be considered a key measure of
social welfare. Let f(ci) be the economy’s density of bankers with monitoring
cost ci. Then assuming tranching is permitted, the quantity of quasi-safe
deposits produced by banks that choose first-best effort is∫ cT
c
γm(ci)f(ci)dci, (2.23)
where each bank that exerts first best effort issues quasi-safe deposits equal
to γm(ci) = k
pbd(ah(ci))−ciah(ci)
pbRC/℘−[pbd(ah(ci))−ciah(ci)] and where the high effort - no effort
monitoring cost threshold, cT , is given by equation (2.22).
Each no-effort bank issues quasi-safe, senior deposits equal to γs given
by equation (2.20). Thus, total quasi-safe deposit production combines both
the high-effort banks’ total deposits and the no-effort banks’ senior deposits.
Denoting the economy’s total quasi-safe deposits under tranching as ScT , it
satisfies
ScT =
∫ cT
c
γm(ci)f(ci)dci + γ
s
∫ c¯
cT
f(ci)dci. (2.24)
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Assuming a uniform density for monitoring costs, equation (2.24) simplifies to
ScT =
1
c¯− c
[∫ cT
c
γm(ci)dci + γ
s(c¯− cT )
]
. (2.25)
Since quasi-safe deposits are vulnerable to losses in the catastrophe state, there
is the potential for a government with taxing authority to improve welfare by
producing assets that are safe in all future states, including severe crises. The
next section considers this possibility by way of government deposit insurance.
2.3 Liquidity Creation with Government Deposit
Insurance
In this section, we first discuss a feature that can give a governmental advan-
tage to producing safe assets, namely, the government’s ability to tax sources
of income that may not be available to private creditors. We then consider
the particular case of government-backed bank deposits.
2.3.1 Taxes as a Source of Public Liquidity
Relative to private entities, a government’s power to tax can give it an advan-
tage in producing safe assets. In particular, a government might raise revenue
from sources of income that may be difficult to pledge under private contracts.
Future revenue from human capital, i.e., wage income, may be an example.
Payment from an individual’s future wages may be difficult to collect under
private contracts due to bankruptcy laws that provide limited protection to
private creditors. Compared to the rights of private creditors, a government
typically is in a stronger position to collect taxes that are owed.
We model a government’s taxing authority by assuming that savers receive
end-of-period wage income that is riskless and equal to ω per unit of beginning-
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of-period savings.13 These wages are not pledgeable under private contracts,
but a government is able to tax a proportion t¯ ≤ 1.14 This taxable proportion
might be determined by moral hazard considerations: if the tax rate is too
high, individuals may have an incentive to evade taxes.15
The government’s taxing capacity gives it the ability to create assets
that are default-free, even in the catastrophe state. Examples might include
Treasury debt, such as Treasury bills, and government-insured debt or de-
posits. These assets’ moneyness and liquidity are assumed to be particularly
attractive to savers such that perfectly safe assets’ required return equals
RF where RF < RC < RR. Written in terms of liquidity premia, we have
RR = (1+ l)RC = (1+ l)(1+ lf )RF . Thus, increasing safety is associated with
higher liquidity premia that reduce the returns required by savers.
The next section considers one way that a government can create a fully-
safe asset, namely, deposit insurance. Following that, we consider safe asset
production by a government that issues its own debt.
2.3.2 Deposit Insurance
Suppose that the government offers fairly-priced deposit insurance to private
banks that permits insured deposits to be default-free in all end-of-period
states, including both the ‘bad’ and ‘catastrophe’ states when loans default.
Since deposit insurance is backed by the government’s power to tax savers’ end-
of-period wages, the amount of these taxes is state-contingent. Yet for deposit
13Our results are not sensitive to the assumption that wage income is riskless. What
matters is that there is some strictly positive minimum level of wages that can be taxed
even in the catastrophe state.
14If wages could be pledged under private contracts, individuals could underwrite insur-
ance against a bank’s default on its deposits; that is, savers could provide credit protection.
Or, alternatively, individuals could issue riskless debt at the beginning of the period backed
by their future wages. Both actions could increase the amount of safe assets.
15A similar, but alternative, assumption would be to have a direct cost to raising taxes
that is increasing and convex in the amount raised. This cost would subtract from social
welfare.
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insurance to be fully credible, it must insure deposits in case of catastrophe
when each bank’s assets are worthless. This worst-state scenario limits insured
deposits to equal the government’s maximum revenue that can be raised in
taxes at the end of the period.
We assume that the insurer limits its maximum liability by restricting the
quantity of deposits that it will insure at each bank. One can imagine that
this policy is implemented by limiting insurance to small “retail” deposits,
assumed to equal a proportion γr of total savings in each banking market.
Consequently, we assume the maximum promised end-of-period payment to
insured depositors is γrRF for each bank.
Because our intent is to study the potential amount of safe assets that a
government can create with deposit insurance, we do not consider the well-
known distortions due to insurance mis-pricing.16 Rather, we assume the
government assesses a fair insurance premium payable by the bank at the
end of the period, where φ is the premium per promised payment on insured
deposits.17 Specifically, if a bank chooses to issue the maximum amount of
insured deposits, then its total promised payment to insured depositors and
the deposit insurer is γrRF (1 +φ). Because deposit insurance is fairly priced,
the premium φ will vary across banks based on their default risk.
Not all banks may choose to issue the maximum amount of insured de-
posits. A bank’s equilibrium choice can depend on its individual cost of mon-
itoring, ci. We begin by taking as given the government deposit insurance
limit of γr for each banking market and determining an individual bank’s
profit-maximizing choice of insured deposits. Then we will aggregate over all
16While extensive empirical evidence suggests deposit insurance is typically under-priced,
it is possible that a government might want to set higher-than-fair deposit insurance premi-
ums in order to capture the liquidity premium from its creation of fully-safe assets. Since
governments do not seem to embrace this practice, we leave this issue for future research.
17We assume the premium is distributed as a lump sum payment to savers in the good
state.
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banking markets to determine the maximum level of γr that can be supported
by the government’s taxing power.
High Cost Banks
Recall that in the absence of deposit insurance, banks with relatively high
monitoring costs choose maximum leverage (γ = 1), zero effort (al = 0),
and tranche their deposits such that the promised payment on senior deposits
equals the bank’s asset return in the bad state (γs given by equation (2.20)).
In equilibrium, these banks’ expected cost of quasi-safe senior deposits is RC
and their expected cost of junior deposits is RR.
For the sake of both simplicity and realism, we assume that the maximum
amount of insured deposits, γr, is such that γrRF ≥ γsRC/℘ = (1+k)RL(1−
α). In other words, the maximum promised payment on insured deposits
exceeds the no-effort bank’s asset return in the bad state. Thus, if this bank
issues the maximum amount of insured deposits, it has no incentive to issue
senior deposits. Moreover, as will be shown, when the bank is charged a fair
deposit insurance premium, its expected cost of insured deposits is RF and its
expected cost of uninsured deposits is RR. Since, compared to the uninsured
case, the bank’s insured deposits exceeds senior deposits and its uninsured
deposits are less than junior deposits, the bank is strictly more profitable
under deposit insurance and, indeed, has an incentive to issue the maximum
amount of insured deposits and total deposits.
To see this, consider the fair deposit insurance premium, which we assume
the bank promises to pay at the end of the period.18 We continue to use the
superscript ‘l’ to denote the no-effort bank’s quantities. Now when deposit
insurance is fairly priced, the expected deposit insurance premium equals ex-
pected deposit insurance losses. In the ‘bad’ state, losses equal the shortfall
18Assuming a promised end-of-period payment makes the premium analogous to a credit
spread on uninsured debt.
25
between insured deposits owed per bank, γrRF , and the recovery rate. As
in actual practice, the insurer has the same seniority (bankruptcy claimant
status) as uninsured depositors. Thus the insurer only receives the proportion
γr of the recovery value, (γl + k)d(al) = (1 + k)RL(1−α). In the catastrophe
state, which occurs with probability pc = (1−pg−pb), no assets are recovered.
The premium is set such that:
pgφ
lγrRF = pb[γ
rRF − γr(1 + k)RL(1− α)] + pcγrRF . (2.26)
Solving for the insurance premium, one can see that it is independent of the
proportion of insured deposits:
φl =
(1− pg)RF − pb(1 + k)RL(1− α)
pgRF
. (2.27)
As bank funding costs are linear in γr, banks will either insure up to
the limit or not at all. However, since RF < RR, the funding cost of insured
deposits is lower than that of uninsured deposits. Defining the promised return
on uninsured deposits as RD,u, it is straightforward to show that
(1 + φl)RF ≤ RD,u (2.28)
where the uninsured deposit return is the same as under the no insurance, no
tranching case:19
RD,u =
RR − pb(1 + k)RL(1− α)
pg
. (2.29)
The intuition is that even when a bank pays a fair premium that covers the
deposit insurer’s expected loss, there is still a benefit that accrues to the bank
because depositors require a lower interest rate when deposits are fully default-
free and liquid. The no-effort bank’s profit with deposit insurance, denoted
as pilDI , equals
pilDI =pg{(1 + k)RL − γr(1 + φl)RF − (1− γr)RD,u} (2.30)
=(1 + k)[pgRL + pbRL(1− α)]− {γrRF + (1− γr)RR}
19See Proposition 1.
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Comparing the bank’s profit relative to the case of no insurance but tranched
deposits, we obtain:
pilDI − pilT =γr(RR −RF )− lγsRC
=l(γr − γs)RC + γrlfRF > 0. (2.31)
Insurance allows banks to reduce their funding costs and is increasing in the
liquidity premia, l and lf , and the deposit insurance coverage γ
r.
Least Cost banks
There may be banks with the lowest costs that choose total leverage, γ, sat-
isfying γr ≤ γ ≤ γmDI,L, where γmDI,L(ci) is a maximum level of total leverage
that gives these least cost banks an incentive to exert high effort, ah(ci). In
other words, these very low cost banks limit their leverage, but this limited
leverage is still above the deposit insurance limit. These banks would not de-
fault on their insured or uninsured deposits in the bad state, so that insurance
only needs to cover the catastrophe state. Consequently, these banks would
pay a reduced premium per insured deposit, φh, in both good and bad states
that satisfies:
℘φhγrRF = (1− ℘)γrRF (2.32)
This premium is equal to the simple ratio of the probability that the catas-
trophe occurs to the probability that it does not
φh =
1− ℘
℘
=
pc
1− pc . (2.33)
In the absence of deposit insurance, these high-effort banks paid RD = RC/℘
on all deposits in both the good and bad states. They continue to pay that
amount on their currently uninsured deposits that equal γ − γr. However, on
their γr of insured deposits they pay (1 + φh)RF = RF /℘ in both the good
and bad states. Hence, they obtain a per deposit savings of (RC − RF )/℘
on their insured deposits, which reflects the savings of the liquidity premium
lfRF /℘.
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The lower promised payment on insured deposits allows these banks to
increase their total leverage beyond the amount γm(ci) which was their max-
imum in the absence of deposit insurance. Appendix A shows that their new
maximum leverage under deposit insurance is
γmDI,L =
pbγ
r(RC −RF )/℘+ k(pbd(ah)− ciah)
pbRC/℘− [pbd(ah)− ciah] ,
=γm + γr
pb [RC −RF ] /℘
pbRC/℘− [pbd(ah)− ciah] . (2.34)
With this higher leverage, the bank’s profits are now
pihDI,L = (γ
m
DI,L + k)[pgRL + pbd(a
h)− ciah]− γmDI,LRC + γr(RC −RF ).
(2.35)
Comparing the profit in equation (2.35) to that of no insurance case, we obtain
pihDI,L − pih =(γmDI,L − γm)(pgRL + pbd(ah)− ciah −RC) + γr(RC −RF ) > 0
(2.36)
Moderately-Low Cost Banks
There may be banks with moderately-low costs that choose total leverage, γ,
satisfying γ ≤ γmDI,M ≤ γr, where γmDI,M (ci) is the maximum total leverage
that gives these moderately-low cost banks an incentive to exert high effort,
ah(ci). Hence, these banks maximize profits by limiting leverage to a level
that is below the deposit insurance limit. Therefore they issue only insured
deposits so that their expected cost of all of their deposits falls from RC to
RF . The lower deposit rate and premium of RF /℘ compared to RC/℘ allows
them to raise maximum leverage relative to the no deposit insurance case:
γmDI,M = k
pbd(a
h)− ciah
ciah + pb[RF /℘− d(ah)] > γ
m(ci). (2.37)
One can see that γmDI,M takes the exact same form as γ
m except that the
smaller value RF replaces RC in the denominator, making it larger than γ
m.
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Given this higher leverage, profits for these moderately-low cost banks are
pihDI,M = (γ
m
DI,M + k)[pgRL + pbd(a
h)− ciah]− γmDI,MRF , (2.38)
which is, of course, greater than profits in the no-insurance case:
pihDI,M − pih =(γmDI,M − γm)[pgRL + pbd(ah)− ciah −RF ] + γmlfRF > 0
(2.39)
2.3.3 Cost Threshold for Effort under Deposit Insurance
The maximum leverage levels for moderately-low cost and least-cost banks are
defined by being on either side of the insurance limit, γr; that is γmDI,M ≤ γr ≤
γmDI,L. Since, by definition, moderately-low cost banks have higher screening
costs than the least-cost banks, the cost threshold between high-effort and no
effort is defined as cDI that sets the profits associated with moderately-low
cost banks under insurance equal to that of insured no-effort banks:
pihDI,M (c
DI) = pilDI(γ
r). (2.40)
We can now state the following proposition:
Proposition 3. If deposit insurance is sufficiently generous such that γr >
γr∗, then cDI < cT ; that is, more banks make no effort to monitor compared
to the case of no deposit insurance. Moreover, in this case total leverage and
lending is greater when deposits are insured.
Proof: See Appendix A which also gives the value of γr∗ in equation (A.22).
An implication of this proposition is that while greater deposit insurance
coverage creates more fully-safe assets, it comes at a cost of less efficient mon-
itoring by the banking industry. Note that since cT < c∗, sufficiently generous
deposit insurance reduces bank effort relative to the no deposit insurance case
whether or not banks tranche their deposits.
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The second result of the proposition, namely that total leverage and lend-
ing is greater under deposit insurance, follows from two of our prior results.
First, we showed that for any given level of monitoring cost, high effort least
cost banks and high effort moderately-low cost banks choose higher leverage
(and enjoy higher profits) under deposit insurance. Second, since no effort
banks choose maximum leverage of γ = 1 and there are more no effort banks
under deposit insurance when γr > γr∗, then leverage is always greater in
equilibrium for any given bank’s level of monitoring cost. Consequently, the
greater deposit cost saving from sufficiently generous deposit insurance ex-
pands total lending, even though a greater proportion of banks lend ineffi-
ciently.
2.3.4 The Maximum Level of Deposit Insurance
If the catastrophe state occurs, banks’ assets equal zero and the deposit in-
surer’s liability equals the total quantity of all insured deposits. Deposit insur-
ance will be credible ex ante only if tax revenue can cover these catastrophic
insurance claims. This is achieved by limiting insurance to small “retail”
deposits so that the maximum promised end-of-period payment to insured
depositors is γrRF for each bank. However, we know that moderately-low
cost banks do not insure up to the limit, and this fact needs to be accounted
for when setting the maximum insurance level, γr, that in equilibrium is con-
sistent with the deposit insurer’s total liability being no greater than the
government’s taxing capacity.
Define the maximum liability of the deposit insurer per unit of initial
savings as L(γr). It must equal the government’s taxing capacity per initial
savings:
L(γr) = t¯ω. (2.41)
It is assumed that the tax base t¯ω is large enough such the equilibrium value
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of γr implies that no effort banks have no desire to tranche their deposits. In
other words, as was assumed earlier γrRF ≥ γsRC/℘. Therefore, no effort
banks’ uninsured deposits will then equal 1− γr.
Banks with the lowest and highest monitoring costs will issue the maximum
insured deposits, but banks with moderately-low monitoring costs will choose
to restrict their leverage to γmDI,M < γ
r. Let cm be the cost threshold which
sets γmDI,M = γ
r and distinguishes a least cost bank from a moderately-low
cost bank. The total liability of the insurer is
L(γr) =
∫ cm
c
γrRF ·f(ci)dci+
∫ cDI
cm
γmDI,M (ci)RF ·f(ci)dci+
∫ c¯
cDI
γrRF ·f(ci)dci,
(2.42)
or, if we assume a uniform distribution for ci ∈ (c, c¯),
L(γr) =
1
c¯− c
[∫ cDI
cm
γmDI,M (ci)dci + γ
r(cm − c + c¯− cDI)
]
RF . (2.43)
Equating the right-hand sides of equations (2.42) and (2.41) and using equa-
tion (2.40) determines the equilibrium values of cDI and γr. Appendix A.2
sets out the strategy for computing the solution.
2.3.5 Aggregate Liquidity under Deposit Insurance
Government deposit insurance provides catastrophe-proof, safe assets. Least
cost banks and no-effort banks both insure up to the limit, γr. Moderately-low
cost banks issue only γmDI,M (ci) < γ
r insured deposits. Together, safe assets
are produced in quantity SfDI ,
SfDI = γ
r
∫ cm
c
f(ci)dci +
∫ cDI
cm
γmDI,M (ci)f(ci)dci + γ
r
∫ c¯
cDI
f(ci)dci (2.44)
or, if costs are distributed uniform,
SfDI =
1
c¯− c
[
γr(cm − c) +
∫ cDI
cm
γmDI,M (ci)dci + γ
r(c¯− cDI)
]
. (2.45)
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The quantity of ‘quasi-safe’ assets, ScDI , produced by least-cost banks is
ScDI =
∫ cm
c
(γmDI,L(ci)− γr)f(ci)dci, (2.46)
or with uniform costs,
ScDI =
1
c¯− c
[∫ cm
c
γmDI,L(ci)dci − γr(cm − c)
]
. (2.47)
Having analyzed deposit insurance, the next section considers an alternative
means by which governments can create safe assets.
2.4 Liquidity Creation with Government Debt and
Narrow Banking
Instead of providing deposit insurance, suppose the government utilizes its
taxing authority to offer default-free Treasury securities that pay the fully
risk-free return per unit investment of RF . Treasury securities could be sold
directly to savers, but to enhance their liquidity it might be more realistic to
think that these securities are sold to financial institutions that use them to
back deposit-like accounts. We refer to these institutions as “narrow banks.”
Narrow banks are assumed to have a mutual fund structure, hold only Trea-
sury securities as assets, and issue accounts that are proportional ownership
interests in the securities. In other words, they operate exactly like actual
“Treasury-only” money market mutual funds.
These narrow banks are assumed to be uniformly distributed across the
economy’s banking markets. Since, by law, they must hold only government
securities, the maximum amount of deposits that they can issue per unit
savings is
γn =
t¯ω
RF
(2.48)
where the parametric condition t¯ω < RF is assumed, so that γ
n < 1. We
assume that each narrow bank in each market issues the maximum amount of
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deposit accounts, γn, because savers have a (slight) preference for completely-
safe assets, even at the lower required return of RF .
Since each banking market continues to have a banker capable of making
loans, uninsured “broad” banks still operate in each market. We assume that
these broad banks operate similarly to the private banks of our baseline model
analyzed in Section 2. In particular, it is assumed that they are permitted to
tranche their deposits. Now the amount of deposits that these broad banks
can raise from savers depends critically on what the government is assumed
to do with the revenue that it receives from selling its Treasury securities to
narrow banks.
One possibility is to assume that the revenue raised per unit savings in each
market, γn, is invested by the government in the publicly-available risky invest-
ment technology which returns RR/pg per unit investment in the good state.
When the good state occurs, the government returns the amount γnRR/pg in
a lump sum to savers at the end of the period. Under this assumption, the
maximum amount of deposits per market that is available to fund broad banks
would be 1−γn. We refer to this assumption as the ‘Government Investment’
assumption.
Another possibility is to assume that the government’s revenue from Trea-
sury sales, γn, is instantly rebated in a lump sum to savers at the beginning of
the period. Under this assumption, the deposits issued by narrow banks have
no net effect on each market’s savings that can be tapped by broad banks.
Consequently, the maximum amount of deposits available to broad banks is
1.20 We refer to this assumption as the ‘Government Rebate’ assumption.
20An equivalent assumption is that the government does not rebate the revenue to savers
but offers to deposit it in broad banks. In markets where broad banks choose deposits of
γ < 1, then the government invests its residual revenue in the risky investment technology.
Any deposit and investment returns received by the government at the end of the period is
returned to savers in a lump sum.
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The next section considers the equilibrium under the Government Invest-
ment assumption. Following that, we discuss the equilibrium under the Gov-
ernment Rebate assumption.
2.4.1 Equilibrium with Narrow Banks and Government
Investment
With a government investing its Treasury revenue in the risky technology, the
maximum amount of savings that an uninsured broad bank can attract for
deposits is γd ≡ 1 − γn < 1 rather than γ = 1. So one sees that the effect
of narrow banks taking market share is to limit the leverage of broad banks.
This market-induced leverage limit changes the incentives for expending effort
by broad banks because profits in the no-effort case are less. With tranching
permitted, the analysis is similar to that in Section 2.1. Only no effort banks
have an incentive to tranche their deposits. They issue ‘quasi-safe’ deposits
at rate RC/℘ up to the reduced limit γ
s
NB =
(γd+k)RL(1−α)
RC/℘
. Their profits are
pilNB =pg
[
(γd + k)RL − γsNBRC/℘− (γd − γsNB)RR/pg
]
=(γd + k) [pgRL + pbRL(1− α)]− γsNBRc − (γd − γsNB)RR
=(γd + k) [pgRL + (℘(1 + l)− pg)RL(1− α)]− γdRR < pilT . (2.49)
High effort banks limit leverage to the same level, γm(ci) = k
pbd(a
h)−ciah
RC/℘−(pbd(ah)−ciah)
as before unless γm(ci) > γ
d, in which case they choose γd.
Threshold for Effort under Government Investment
Define pih(ci) as the high effort profit of banker i given in equation (2.10) when
γi = min[γ
m(ci), γ
d]. Then assuming pih(c¯) < pilNB, we can define the critical
value of c such that a given bank’s profits are equal when it provides high
versus no effort. Profits at this critical value, cn, satisfy pih(cn) = pilNB. It can
be written as
cn =
pilNBpb(RL −RC/℘)
( 1β + a
h(cn)(pilNB − pgkRC/℘)
(2.50)
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Suppose that the model parameters are such that γm(cn) ≤ γd so that the
bank which is indifferent between high effort and no effort limits its leverage
under high effort to less than γd. Since pilNB < pi
l
T , then based on the same
logic as in Proposition 2, we have cn > cT . In other words, a greater proportion
of broad banks choose high effort compared to the proportion choosing high
effort under tranching with no deposit insurance.
Liquidity Provision under Government Investment
Fully safe deposits are now produced only by narrow banks. Since they are
limited by the government’s taxing authority, the maximum that can be pro-
duced is
SfNB = γ
n. (2.51)
Note that, in aggregate, the maximum fully-safe deposits that can be produced
under narrow banking is exactly the same as under deposit insurance. This is
because under deposit insurance, the government needs to have enough taxes
to pay off the entire amount of insured deposits in the catastrophe state.
Similarly under narrow banking, the government requires enough taxes to pay
off narrow banks in all states. In both cases the government’s tax capacity,
t¯ω, limits the maximum level of fully-safe deposits.
However, quasi-safe asset production differs under narrow banking and
deposit insurance. Under narrow banking, one source of quasi-safe deposits
comes from high-effort broad banks which provide∫ cn
c
min [γm(ci), γ
d]f(ci)dci. (2.52)
The second source is the senior deposits of no-effort banks who add
γsNB
∫ c¯
cn
f(ci)dci. (2.53)
Together, total quasi-safe deposits equal
ScNB =
∫ cn
c
min [γm(ci), γ
d]f(ci)dci + γ
s
NB
∫ c¯
cn
f(ci)dci. (2.54)
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If a uniform distribution of costs is assumed, we have
ScNB =
1
c¯− c
[∫ cn
c
min [γm(ci), γ
d]dci + γ
s
NB(c¯− cn)
]
. (2.55)
Recall that under deposit insurance only least cost banks produce quasi-safe
deposits, given by ScDI in equation (2.46). Moreover, under some parametric
assumptions least cost banks do not exist and only moderately-low cost banks
exert first-best effort. Consequently, it is highly likely that quasi-safe deposits
are greater under narrow banking with Government Investment compared to
deposit insurance. As a result, total liquidity creation is also grater.
2.4.2 Equilibrium with Narrow Banks and Government
Rebate
If a government’s beginning-of-period proceeds from Treasury sales are in-
stantly rebated to savers, the constraint on the amount of deposits raised by
broad banks is γ ≤ 1. Therefore, the equilibrium for broad banks is exactly
the same as the fully-private banking system analyzed in Section 2. Thus, all
of the results from that section apply to broad banks, but now the banking
system produces the maximum amount of fully-safe deposits issued by narrow
banks.
Comparing this narrow bank with Government Rebate system to the de-
posit insurance system analyzed in Section 3, we can immediately draw the
following conclusions. First, the amount of fully-safe deposits are exactly the
same under the two systems, since they are limited by the same government
constraint on tax capacity. Second, quasi-safe deposits are unambiguously
greater under narrow banking relative to deposit insurance. This follows be-
cause under deposit insurance only high-effort least cost banks produce quasi-
safe deposits. Under narrow banking, quasi-safe deposits of broad banks com-
prise the tranched senior deposits of no effort banks and the total deposits of
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all high effort banks. Consequently, total public and private liquidity creation
is greater under narrow banking versus deposit insurance.
Third, when deposit insurance is sufficiently generous such that γr > γr∗,
then a higher proportion of broad banks exert effort and lend efficiently com-
pared to banks with deposit insurance. This result follows from Proposition 3
which compares deposit insurance to an uninsured banking system, which now
applies to broad banks. A fourth conclusion also follows from Proposition 3:
a system with sufficiently generous deposit insurance leads to greater leverage
and total lending compared to a system of narrow and bank broad banks.
Why does a system of narrow banking with a government rebate produce
the same amount of fully-safe deposits as under a system of deposit insurance
but far more quasi-safe deposits? The intuition is as follows. In terms of
liquidity creation, a government’s power to tax allows it to create assets that
are fully default-free in all future states, even the catastrophe state. Banks, on
the other hand, can create quasi-safe assets that are default-free in all states
except for the catastrophe state. By insuring a bank’s deposits, a government
starts with a financial structure that is already capable of producing quasi-
safe assets and adds safety in only one additional state, the catastrophe state.
Hence, the government’s special ability to create safety via taxation adds a
small margin of additional safety to deposits that are already quasi-safe.
This mechanism for creating fully-safe assets is inefficient relative to narrow
banking with a government rebate. By issuing Treasuries purchased by narrow
banks, a government creates fully-default free deposits from scratch. By not
layering on already existing banks, the government does not extinguish the
existing quasi-safe deposits produced by the private banking system. If there
is, indeed, value to quasi-safe deposits, the system with narrow banking and
a government rebate generates is more efficient in expanding total liquidity.
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2.5 Numerical Illustrations
This section provides numerical comparisons of aggregate welfare measures for
the three previously-discussed government regimes: deposit insurance, nar-
row banks with government investment, and narrow banks with government
rebates.
2.5.1 Welfare Measures
We assume that banks are able to tranche deposits and that the density of
bank monitoring costs is distributed uniform. Using the fully-private banking
system as a baseline, we consider the following measures of social welfare, set
out explicitly in appendix A.3.
1. Quasi-safe deposit production and its aggregate surplus.
2. Total bank loans and the surplus from financing projects.
3. Total monitoring effort exerted by banks.
4. Bank profits.
The surplus from issuing quasi-safe deposits for regime r is equal to the quan-
tity produced multiplied by their liquidity premium, (RR −RC) = lRC :
SurplusSr = (RR −RC)Scr . (2.56)
Loan surplus is defined as the expected loan revenue less the costs of monitor-
ing and funding at RR. That is, a bank with monitoring cost, effort and total
leverage {ci, ai, γi} has surplus equal to (γi+k)[pgRL+pbd(ai)− ciai]−γiRR.
In the fully-private bank system, this is simply equal to aggregate profits, ΠT ,
less the reduction in funding costs due to the liquidity premium from issuing
quasi-safe deposits:
SurplusLT =ΠT − SurplusST . (2.57)
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This is also the loan surplus for the case of narrow banking with a government
rebate since broad banks operate the same as banks in the fully-private system.
For the case of narrow banking with government investment, loan surplus is
SurplusLNB,I =ΠNB,I − SurplusSNB,I . (2.58)
Under deposit insurance, some loans are funded by fully-safe deposits that
generate extra surplus for banks
SurplusLDI =ΠDI − SurplusSDI − (RR −RF )SfDI . (2.59)
Note that deposit insurance and narrow banking produce equal amounts of
safe deposits, so there is no need for comparing this aggregate welfare measure.
2.5.2 Calibration
Table 2.1 reports the benchmark parameter values used in our illustrations.
We set the fully-safe return at 1.02, the expected quasi-safe return at 1.03,
and the expected risky return at 1.04. These rates imply a liquidity premium
of 100 basis points for each increase in safety. The promised loan return is
assumed to be 1.10, and the probabilities of the good, bad, and catastrophe
states are 90%, 9%, and 1%, respectively. The amount of banker capital per
unit of market savings, k, is set at 10%. The recovery rate with no effort is
assumed to be 50%, implying a value of α = 0.5. The coefficient on bank
effort, β, is set to 1. The maximum tax rate t¯ equals 40% of end-of-period
endowment of ω = 1.5.21
21The choice of taxation is made to arrive at reasonable values of maximum insured
deposits, γr. Note that FDIC data from 2017 Quarter 3 imply a ratio of insured domestic
U.S. deposits to total bank debt of 0.78.
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Table 2.1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value
Risk-free return RF 1.02
Safe liquidity premium l 0.01
Quasi-safe liquidity premium lf 0.01
Promised loan return RL 1.10
Probability of good state pg 0.90
Probability of bad state pb 0.09
Bank capital per savings k 0.10
Loan loss parameter α 0.50
Monitoring effort parameter β 1.00
Tax limit t¯ 0.40
Endowment ω 1.50
Table 2.2 reports particular deposit limits implied by the parameters in
Table 1. The maximum level of insured deposits, γr, is 0.63 and the maxi-
mum level of deposits available to broad banks under narrow banking with
government investment, γd, is 0.41. Recall that under government investment,
narrow banks’ deposits ‘crowd out’ the deposits available to broad banks. Nar-
row banking with a government rebate avoids this problem. The proportion
of banks exerting high effort under the regime of narrow banking with gov-
ernment rebate is 0.49. In addition, Proposition 3 holds for these parameter
values, so that under deposit insurance a smaller 0.35 proportion of banks ex-
ert high effort.22 Narrow banking with government investment has the largest
proportion of (broad) banks exerting high effort, 0.73. This occurs because
less deposit availability makes choosing the highest leverage and no effort less
profitable.
Table 2.2: Implied Deposit Limits and Effort Levels
Parameter
Deposit
Insurance
Narrow Banking
with Investment
Narrow Banking
with Rebate
Tax-limit on leverage γr, γd 0.63 0.41 1.00
Proportion of high effort banks c
∗
c¯−c 0.35 0.73 0.49
22The restriction on insurance, γr = 0.63 is greater than the threshold, γr∗ = 0.39.
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Figure 2.1 illustrates the structure of the banking system under each
regime.23 Banks with relatively low monitoring costs, ci, find it optimal to
exert high effort and have profits shown in black. Banks with relatively high
monitoring costs exert no effort, with profits in red. Under deposit insurance,
for this baseline calibration, only moderately-low cost banks exist. Their prof-
its are illustrated by the dashed black line.
Note that no effort banks profit the most under deposit insurance because
the fully-safe liquidity premium makes their cost of deposit funding the least.
No effort broad banks under the narrow bank system with government in-
vestment make the least profit because their leverage, 1 − γn, is less due to
crowding out from narrow banks.
Figure 2.1: Individual Bank Profits Under Each Regime.
Table 2.3 compares various measures of welfare under the three government
regimes. These measures are averages per loan-making bank. As discussed
earlier, for this calibration the only high effort banks that exist under deposit
23Of course for narrow banking systems, these graphs refer to only broad banks. Narrow
banks extend no loans and issue no quasi-safe deposits. They issue fully-safe deposits (or
money market mutual fund shares) and invest in Treasury debt, making zero profit.
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insurance are those with moderately-low costs. Since only least cost banks
would issue quasi-safe deposits, there are no quasi-safe deposits under this
deposit insurance regime. Under narrow banking regimes, quasi-safe deposits
are issued by broad banks, and since there is more deposit availability under
narrow banking with a government rebate, this regime produces the most.
Due to the low cost of insured deposits and less incentives to limit leverage,
the table also shows that insured banks make the most loans. Among nar-
row bank regimes, broad banks make more loans when there is a government
rebate due to the greater availability of deposits. One also sees that monitor-
ing effort is highest under narrow banking with government investment. Yet
with a rebate, effort is still substantially higher than under deposit insurance.
The last line of Table 2.3 aggregates the bank profits that were illustrated
in Figure 2.1 and shows that average bank profits are greatest under deposit
insurance.
Table 2.3: Welfare Comparisons
Measure of Social
Welfare
Deposit
Insurance
Narrow Banking
with Investment
Narrow Banking
with Rebate
Quasi-safe deposits Sc 0.000 0.241 0.494
Liquidity surplus SurplusS 0.000 0.002 0.005
Loans L 1.016 0.699 0.900
Loan surplus SurplusL 0.128 0.111 0.115
Monitoring effort A 0.182 0.506 0.340
Profit per bank Π 0.116 0.108 0.110
2.5.3 Comparative Statics
This section considers how the aggregate production of quasi-safe deposits,
loans, and bank profits are affected by variation in key parameters. We begin
by adjusting the liquidity premium on quasi-safe deposits which allows banks
to fund loans at less than the expected return RR, which is held constant. In
Figure 2.2 the premium on quasi-safe deposits, l, varies by plus or minus 100
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basis points while holding the premium on fully-safe deposits, lf , constant.
Equivalently, RC changes while changing RF by the same amount.
24 The re-
sults show that increasing the quasi-safe liquidity premium leads broad banks
to issue more quasi-safe deposits and more loans. Profits rise, but the pro-
portion of high-effort banks falls. Apparently, the higher liquidity premium
gives a relative advantage to high leverage and tranching of deposits, rather
than high effort. Under deposit insurance, insured banks issue no quasi-safe
deposits but the reduction in RF leads to greater profits and slightly less high
effort banks.
Figure 2.2: Varying the Quasi-safe Liquidity Premium, l, Holding lf Constant
Figure 2.3 demonstrates that an increase in banker capital, k, raises aver-
age bank profits and the proportion of high effort banks in all three regimes.25
However, broad banks’ quasi-safe deposit and loan production is not mono-
tonic in capital. Ceteris paribus, more capital increases total assets available
24The results are very similar if we vary RC while holding RF constant.
25Due to the restriction that γr > γs, there are no solutions for deposit insurance when
capital is higher than 15%.
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to banks, but as greater capital makes high effort relatively more attractive,
a greater proportion of banks limit their leverage such that quasi-safe deposit
and loan production can decline.
Figure 2.3: Varying Bank Capital, k
Figure 2.4 shows that increasing the loss rate reduces profits and increases
the relative benefit of high effort monitoring.26 Since collateral for senior
tranched deposits of no effort broad banks declines and more broad banks
limit leverage, the result is that quasi-safe deposits and loans decline.
26Note that for values of α exceeding 0.55, all broad banks find it optimal to exert high
effort; that is, cn = c¯.
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Figure 2.4: Varying the Default Loss Rate, α
2.6 Robustness of the Model’s Results
This section discusses the robustness of our results to reasonable changes
in the model’s assumptions. One stark assumption is that bank loans are
worthless in the catastrophe state. Instead, one might expect that loans have
a positive minimum recovery value, even if a catastrophe occurs. If that were
the case, then our model with zero recovery over-estimates a government’s
deposit insurance losses. Thus, for a given tax capacity, a government could
create more fully-safe deposits under deposit insurance if there was a positive
recovery value in the catastrophe state.
However, if there was a strictly positive minimum recovery value to bank
loans, then even uninsured broad banks could issue some fully-safe deposits.
They could do so by tranching deposits, where the most senior, fully-safe de-
posits would be limited to the minimum recovery value of the bank’s loans.
As a result, when the maximum fully safe deposits of narrow banks and broad
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banks are combined, they would equal the same amount of fully-safe deposits
created by a deposit insurance system. Therefore, assuming a positive min-
imum recovery value does overturn the result that the amount of fully-safe
deposits is independent of the government regime.
In our model’s system of narrow banking, broad banks produce quasi-safe
deposits which, in aggregate, exceed the amount of quasi-safe deposits that
are produced by a system of government deposit insurance. Under govern-
ment deposit insurance, only least cost, high effort banks produce quasi-safe
deposits. As discussed earlier, the low production of quasi-safe deposits oc-
curs because government deposit insurance crowds out what would have been
quasi-safe deposits in the absence of deposit insurance. However, in princi-
ple one might imagine a slightly different system where a government offers
two types of deposit insurance: fully-safe and quasi-safe. In this case, more
quasi-safe assets could be produced under government deposit insurance.
Such as system would work as follows. As in our model, a government
provides a similar level of fully-safe deposit insurance limited to some level
γr. In addition, it would offer supplemental, quasi-safe deposit insurance
that covers losses in all states except the catastrophe state. A government is
able to offer such supplemental quasi-safe insurance because banks’ positive
recovery value in the bad state provides unused taxing capacity relative to the
catastrophe state where there is zero recovery. This bad state taxing capacity
would allow for limited, supplemental quasi-safe deposit insurance. While
such a system could replace some risky, uninsured deposits with quasi-safe
insured deposits, it might be implausible to think that a government would
offer two classes of insurance where for one class it fails to provide protection
for some depositors in some states. Hence, it is not clear that this two-class
deposit insurance system would be politically feasible and that it should be
taken seriously.
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A related issue is whether quasi-safe deposits are truly a social good. Our
analysis implicitly assumed that the greater private liquidity under narrow
banking compared to government deposit insurance was a net social benefit.
However, in richer models that incorporate additional frictions, a competitive
private banking system might inefficiently over-issue quasi-safe deposits Gers-
bach (1998), creating negative externalities such as firesale costs when a crisis
occurs Stein (2012). When deposits are not fully-safe, coordination failures
can lead to inefficient bank run equilibria as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005).
While our model neglects these adverse consequences of quasi-safe deposits,
it also does not account for potential costs of government liquidity. It was
assumed that a government always respects its limit on tax capacity so that
its debt and bank deposit guarantees are fully safe. But as Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009) documents, history provides numerous examples of government
defaults. Even without default, government liquidity in the form of deposit
insurance may create inefficiencies due to bank risk-shifting.27 Mitigating this
moral hazard may require costly bank regulation. So while we acknowledge
that our model misses potential costs of private liquidity, it also neglects other
costs of government liquidity. A more complete modeling of these costs is
needed to provide a definitive answer to the question of how governments
should create liquidity.
2.7 Conclusions
This paper considers constraints on a financial system’s liquidity. The amount
of liquid deposits that can created by private, uninsured banks is limited by
their assets’ recovery values in bad states of nature. Recovery values can
27Our model assumes deposit insurance is risk-sensitive and fairly priced. In practice, de-
posit insurance tends to be risk-insensitive and under-priced, which can worsen risk-shifting
incentives.
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be enhanced by a bank limiting its leverage, thereby instilling incentives to
efficiently monitor borrowers. Alternatively, banks can maximize leverage
and not monitor borrowers but create liquid senior deposits using the extra
collateral provided by junior deposits (subordinated debt).
The amount of liquidity provided by a government is limited by its future
taxing capacity since ultimately taxes are need to cover a government’s lia-
bilities. Importantly, the method that a government uses to create its liquid
assets has consequences for private liquidity creation. Government liquid-
ity created via bank deposit insurance crowds out private liquidity. It also
reduces bank monitoring incentives but maximizes bank lending due to the
government liquidity premium that minimizes banks’ cost of funding.
In contrast, a system by which governments create liquidity by issuing
debt held by narrow banks allows narrow banks to create public liquidity
while uninsured broad banks create private liquidity. Such a system avoids
the crowding out of private liquidity while maintaining broad banks’ incentives
to monitor borrowers. Yet since broad banks’ cost of funding is higher, they
do not match the quantity of lending made by government-insured banks.
Chapter 3
Banks as Potentially Crooked
Secret-Keepers
Bank failures are generally liquidity as well as solvency events.
Whether it is households running on banks or banks running on
banks, defunding episodes are full of drama. This theater has, ar-
guably, lured economists into placing liquidity at the epicenter of
financial collapse. But loss of liquidity describes how banks fail.
Bad news about banks explains why they fail. This paper mod-
els banking crises as triggered by news that the degree (share) of
banking malfeasance is likely to be particularly high. The malfea-
sance share follows a state-dependent Markov process. When this
period’s share is high, agents rationally raise their probability that
next period’s share will be high as well. Whether or not this proves
true, agents invest less in banks, reducing intermediation and out-
put. Deposit insurance prevents such defunding and stabilizes the
economy. But it sustains bad banking, lowering welfare. Private
monitoring helps, but is no panacea. It partially limits banking
malfeasance. But it does so inefficiently as households needlessly
replicate each others’ costly information acquisition. Moreover,
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if private audits become public, private monitoring breaks down
due to free-riding. Government real-time disclosure of banking
malfeasant mitigates, if not eliminates, this public goods problem
leading to potentially large gains in both non-stolen output and
welfare.
3.1 Introduction
Banks (our name for financial institutions, broadly defined) have traditionally
been modeled as honest entities satisfying liquidity needs via issuance of de-
mand deposits and other short-term liabilities (Gorton and Pennacchi (1990)).
Banking crises have been viewed as runs motivated by the fear that others will
appropriate one’s money (Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Goldstein and
Pauzner (2005)). But deposit insurance has largely eliminated concern about
transaction balances. Indeed, the financial crisis of 2007-2008 saw essentially
no traditional commercial bank runs (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
(2011)) by non-institutional investors.1 Instead, as Covitz, Liang, and Suarez
(2013) and others document, banks stopped funding one another based on
perceptions, some true, some false, that financial institutions had gone bad.
The serial collapse of large, highly opaque banks raised concern about the
defunding of surviving, but equally opaque, banks. Attempts to pay creditors
led to fire sales of “troubled” assets. This fed the defunding panic, producing
more implicit and explicit failures. Overnight, bank secret-keeping, which left
potential refunders in the dark about each-other’s true solvency, went from a
sign of collective trust to one of financial distress, if not financial fraud.
Bankruptcies, financial or not, are typically liquidity as well as solvency
1The Northern Rock run was quickly ended by the extension of deposit insurance by the
Bank of England. Similarly, the U.S. Treasury stopped the run on money market funds by
backing their bucks.
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events.2 The 29 global financial institutions that failed, either explicitly or
implicitly, during the Great Recession, all lost or were about to lose external
funding in the run up to their demises. The drama of financial firms running
short of cash – J.P. Morgan’s dramatic 2007 rescue of Wall Street, the se-
rial collapse of 9,000 commercial-banks in the Great Depression, California’s
shocking seizure of Executive Life, the panicked resolution of Long Term Cap-
ital Management, the Fed’s emergency weekend meetings that “saved” Bear
Sterns and let Lehman Brothers collapse, the remarkable nationalizations of
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and AIG, the last minute passage of the Trouble
Asset Relief Program, the urgent IMF-ECB bailout of Cypriot banks, etc.
– naturally focuses attention on banks’ death throes. Yet, how banks fail
does not tell us why banks fail. Short of pure coordination failure (switching
spontaneously to a bad equilibrium), bank failures are triggered by bad news.
Historically, this has been bad news about bad banking, where “bad” includes
fraudulent, irresponsible, negligent, and incompetent behavior. The ability of
runs to weed out bad banks is interfered by the provision of deposit insurance
Kaufman (1987).
Actual or suspected malfeasance has instigated many, perhaps most finan-
cial crises. In 1720, insider trading and fraudulent misrepresentation led to
collapses of both the South Sea and Mississippi bubbles. The attempted cor-
nering of the U.S. bond market kindled the Panic of 1792. The embezzlement
of assets from the Ohio Life and Trust Co. instigated the Railroad Crisis of
1857 (Gibbons (1907)). Jay Gould and James Fisk’s cornering of the gold
market precipitated the 1869 Gold Panic. Cooke and Company’s failure to
disclose losses on Northern Pacific Railroad stock sparked the Panic of 1873.
A failed cornering of United Cooper’s stocks instigated the Panic of 1907.
The Hatry Group’s use of fraudulent collateral to buy United Steel, the sale
of Florida swamp land, the Match King Hoax, the Samuel Insull fraud and the
2Illiquidity can, if sufficiently severe, trigger insolvency.
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disclosure of other swindles ushered in the Great Depression.3 Insider trading
and stock manipulation brought down Drexel Burnham Lambert, precipitat-
ing the largest insurance failure in U.S. history. And revelation of liar loans,
no-doc loans, and NINJA loans laid the groundwork for the demise of major
U.S. and foreign financial firms and the Great Recession.4
This paper focuses on why banks fail. The reason considered is malfea-
sance. We treat intermediation, not liquidity provision via maturity transfor-
mation, as the raison d’eˆtre for banks, and the loss of intermediation services,
not the loss of liquidity or maturity transformation, as the economic essence
of a financial crisis. Our demurral on liquidity and maturity transformation
seems justified by theory and fact. As shown by Jacklin (1983, 1986, 1989)
and Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), bank’s heralded role as maturity trans-
formers can be either fully or largely replicated by financial markets alone.5
But unlike banks, when financial markets transform maturity, they do so with-
out risk of financial panic, which destroys the very liquidity banks are said to
provide.6 There is also scant evidence that banks are effective in transforming
maturities.
Our framework is simple – a two-period OLG model with two sectors –
farming and banking. Both sectors produce an identical good, corn. Farming
is small scale and done by sole proprietors. The banking sector gathers re-
sources from multiple investors and engages in large-scale and more efficient
farming. Production in farming is certain. Production in banking is uncertain
due to banker malfeasance. Specifically, each period every bank has an identi-
cal but random share of dishonest, negligent or incompetent bankers, labeled
3See Pecora Commission (1934).
4See Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011).
5We include mutual funds, which Jacklin calls “equity deposits”, as a financial-market
instrument.
6Ironically, banks are heralded for providing liquidity, yet have, historically, precipitated
its loss precisely at times when it is of most value.
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bad bankers, in their employ. These bankers steal or lose all output arising
from investments placed with them.7 Consequently, if 20 percent of bankers
are bad, the banking industry will produce 20 percent less output. An equiv-
alent interpretation of our model is that a share of banks is fully malfeasant.
I.e. these bank steal or lose all output from investments and arise in the same
proportion as our posited share of bad bankers. In what follows, we reference
“the share of bad bankers.” But one can substitute these words, “the share of
bank output lost due to bad banks.”
The share of bad bankers obeys a state-dependent Markov process. On
average, the share is low enough and banking is productive enough for bank-
ing to generate a higher expected return than farming and, thereby, attract
considerable investment. But when a larger than expected number of bad
bankers surfaces, the projected future share of bad bankers rises. This causes
investors to shift out of banking, potentially abruptly, until sufficient time
has passed to lower the expected share of malfeasant bankers. This process
produces not just periodic and, potentially, extended banking crises, but also
a highly inefficient economy.
Introducing deposit insurance eliminates one problem and introduces an-
other. It ends banking crises but at the price of keeping bad bankers (equiva-
lently, bad banks) in business. This moral hazard is raised in multiple studies
including Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto (2012); Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detra-
giache (1997, 1998, 2002); Calomiris and Haber (2014) and Calomiris, Flan-
dreau, and Laeven (2016). The result is higher total output, but more stolen
output. Since the government levies taxes to fund its insurance of purloined or
lost output, the insurance does nothing to reduce bad-banker risk. Nor does
it insure anything real. It simply induces households to invest with banks
7There are lots of legal ways to “steal,” including charging hidden fees, churning portfo-
lios to generate higher fees, cream-skimming the purchase of assets, buying assets at above-
market price from reciprocating bankers, and taking on excessive risk.
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regardless of the risk. Like a compensated tax, deposit insurance distorts
behavior, producing an excess burden.8
Monitoring banking practices is another option. But information, once
released, becomes a public good. Since households have no incentive to keep
the results of their monitoring private, they will likely share what they know.
In this case, each household will free-ride on the monitoring of others. This
reduces, if not eliminates, monitoring. The first-best policy – disclosure –
addresses the opacity problem directly by shutting down malfeasant bankers’
modus vivendi, namely operating in the dark. Turning on the lights requires
government provision of the missing public good, namely pubic revelation,
either in full or in part (depending on cost), of the malfeasance. This weeds out
bad banking, raising non-stolen output and welfare. The practical counterpart
of this policy prescription is real-time, government disclosure and verification
of all bank assets and liabilities to ensure that the net capital invested in
banks is actually being used to produce output that’s paid to investors and
workers.9
3.2 Literature Review
The seminal Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) articles mod-
eled bank deposits as insurance against unexpected liquidity needs and bank
runs as a switch from a good to a bad equilibrium. These papers sparked
a major literature connecting banking to liquidity. Examples include Jacklin
(1983), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1998), Ro-
chet and Vives (2004), Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), He and Xiong (2012)
8In our model, bad bankers extract resources from the economy, which cannot be re-
claimed by the government. Their theft represents aggregate risk against which the govern-
ment cannot insure. Hence, insurance payments made to households are exactly offset by
taxes to cover those payments.
9As noted by Kotlikoff (2010), this work can be performed by private firms working
exclusively for the government.
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and Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2011).
Liquidity is a key element of the financial system. But is it really at the
heart of banking? And is maturity transformation as important as its preva-
lence in the literature suggests? The Bryant and Diamond-Dybvig liquidity-
insurance/maturity-transformation models predict investment-like returns on
demand and other short-term deposits. Yet real returns on transaction ac-
counts have historically been very small, if not negative. Moreover, modern
economies are replete with health, accident, auto, homeowners, malpractice,
longevity, property and casualty, disability, long-term care insurance, credit
cards, and equity lines of credit – all of which provide liquidity in times of
personal economic crisis. Then there are financial markets, whose securities
can be sold as needed to provide liquidity and transform maturities. Indeed,
Jacklin (1989) argues that equity markets can provide as much liquidity insur-
ance as bank deposits and transform maturities just as well. Moreover, they
can do so with no danger of bank runs or any other type of financial crisis.10
Still, liquidity risk continues to stimulate research. Dang, Gorton, Holm-
stro¨m, and Ordon˜ez (2017) add a new wrinkle to Diamond and Dybvig (1983),
namely the staggered arrival of participants to the liquidity insurance mar-
ket. They show that banking opacity permits late arrivals to participate in
the market since opacity leaves them with no more information than early
arrivals. The work by Dang, Gorton, Holmstro¨m, and Ordon˜ez (2017) echoes
Hirshleifer (1971), who points out that disclosure is detrimental to those hold-
ing claims on overvalued assets. Other researchers, including Holmstro¨m and
Tirole (1998), Andolfatto (2010), Gorton (2009) and Gorton and Ordonez
(2014) warn that public audits, while providing a public good, namely public
10Jacklin’s proviso is that information between investors and banks not be asymmetric
in the context of aggregate risk. We suggest that the asymmetry of information can be
eliminated, either fully or largely in the presence or absence of aggregate risk, by real-
time government-orchestrated or supervised verification and disclosure of bank assets and
liabilities.
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information, comes at the price of market crashes. Whether policymakers are
deliberately limiting audits to protect malfeasant banks is an open question.
Either way, today’s limited, quasi-voluntary disclosure is of limited value. As
Johnson and Kwak (2010) state, “Lehman Brothers ... was more than ade-
quately capitalized on paper, with Tier 1 capital of 11.6 percent, shortly before
it went bankrupt in September 2008. Thanks to the literally voluminous re-
port by the Lehman bankruptcy examiner, we now know this was in part due
to aggressive and misleading accounting.”
Like Stiglitz and Weiss (1981); Diamond (1984); Brealey, Leland, and Pyle
(1977), we treat the problems incumbent in providing intermediation as aris-
ing from asymmetric information – bad bankers know they are bad, household
investors do not. However, those studies stress differential knowledge between
bankers and borrowers whereas our focus is on differential knowledge between
bankers and savers (equivalently, investors). In the former studies, the unob-
servable was the trustworthiness of borrowers. In our study, the unobservable
is the trustworthiness of bankers.
Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) also model
financial malfeasance. However, bankers do not steal or otherwise misap-
propriate output in equilibrium. Borrowing thresholds and the exposure of
equity holders to losses keep such behavior from happening. In our model,
bad bankers expropriate or lose output in equilibrium unless they are disclosed
ex-ante. Disclosure is a natural remedy in our model, but faces real-world ob-
jection from a surprising source, namely regulators. Regulators worry that too
much disclosure in the midst of a financial meltdown can fuel asset fire sales.11
But this concern is about ex-post disclosure. Our focus is on ex-ante disclo-
sure, i.e., preventing malfeasance in advance via, in part, initial and ongoing,
real-time asset verification.
11See www.sec.gov/spotlight/fairvalue/marktomarket/mtmtranscript102908.pdf.
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Our paper extends Chamley, Kotlikoff, and Polemarchakis (2012), which
sets aside the liquidity-insurance/maturity-transformation rationale for bank-
ing. Instead it justifies banks based on their principal economic role – financial
intermediation. And it models bank runs as arising from actual or perceived
malfeasance in the provision of intermediation services. The Chamley, Kot-
likoff, and Polemarchakis (2012) model has a quite different structure and is
static. Ours is dynamic. We consider how current malfeasance undermines
future financial intermediation, productivity and welfare since current malfea-
sance generates lingering doubts about the trustworthiness of bankers. The
banking “runs” considered here are simply decisions to invest less, at least in
the short run, in banks. The associated contraction of the banking sector can
be labeled a liquidity crisis. But the crisis is triggered by news of a larger
than expected share of bad bankers, not the sudden need for money by of a
large segment of the public.
Banks have generally been modeled as honest institutions, which, in their
efforts to provide a full, if risky, return to investors, are occasionally stymied
by panicked or misinformed creditors. Moreover, bad news about banks is
about poor investment returns, not the theft, scams, swindles, Ponzi schemes,
excess fees, etc., recorded in, for example, the Security and Exchange Com-
mission’s Division of Enforcement’s annual reports. The SEC’s enforcement
actions now total over two per week.12 Of course, the SEC only reports frauds
the agency detects.13 It is impossible to say how much financial fraud goes
undetected. Moreover, there are other federal and state government agencies
and branches, such as Massachusetts’ Financial Investigations Division, which
investigate and prosecute financial crime, but do not provide annual listings
of their enforcement actions. And explicit fraud, such as the Madoff or the
Stanford Ponzi schemes, is not the only type of fraud at play. Much financial
12https://www.sec.gov/news/newsroom/images/enfstats.pdf
13A separate metric for financial fraud is provided by www.ponzitracker.com, which
suggests the discovery of one new Ponzi scheme per week in recent years.
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fraud takes subtle forms that is rarely viewed, even by economists, as such.
An example is a bank that legally operates based on proprietary information
to the detriment of the public. Townsend (1979) models this behavior, albeit
without the pejorative connotation. He posits informed agents that force un-
informed agents to enter a debt contract to limit the extent to which they
must pay to investigate cheating. He applies this to borrowers’ incentives to
renege on loans but it could equally be applied to banks’ incentives to cheat
investors.
The obvious policy solution is exposing malfeasant bankers and banking.
Such disclosure, as proposed by Kotlikoff (2010) and to a lesser extent by
Pagano and Volpin (2012) and Hanson and Sunderam (2013), would go far
beyond current practices. It would largely entail real-time verification of bank
assets. Take, for example, mortgage verification. Verifying a mortgage ap-
plication requires determining the employment status, earnings, outstanding
debts, and credit record of the mortgagee and appraising the value of the
house being purchased. Now, as before the Great Recession, U.S. mortgage
verification is in the hands of private lenders, such as the former Country
Wide Financial, a company heavily fined for originating and selling fraudulent
mortgages.14 But such verification could readily be done by the government
or private companies working solely for the government. Indeed, thanks to
its tax records, the government can better verify income on mortgage appli-
cations than the private sector. Had such government mortgage verification
been in place prior to 2007, there would, arguably, have been few, if any, liar,
no-doc, and NINJA loans – all of which appear to have produced a major rise
in the perceived and actual share of bad banks.
14See https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-197.htm
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3.3 The Model
Agents in our OLG framework work full-time when young and are retired
when old. They consume in both periods. Agents born at time t maximize
their expected utility, EUt, given by
EUt = β log cy,t + (1− β)Et log co,t+1, (3.1)
over cy,t, co,t+1 and αs,t, subject to
co,t+1 = At+1[(1− αs,t)(1 + rf,t+1) + αs,t(1 + r˜b,t+1)], (3.2)
and
cy,t +At+1 = wt. (3.3)
The terms cy,t and co,t+1 reference consumption when young and old at t and
t+1, wt is the time-t wage, At+1 equals the time-t saving of generation t, and
rf,t+1 and r˜b,t+1 are the safe and risky returns to farming and banking. The
share of generation t′s assets invested in banking is αs,t. The s subscript ref-
erences the state of mean malfeasance this period, which affects the allocation
decision. Capital does not depreciate. Optimization entails
Cy,t = βwt, (3.4)
At+1 = (1− β)wt, (3.5)
Et
rf,t+1 − r˜b,t+1
1 + (1− αs,t)rf,t+1 + αtr˜b,t+1 = 0. (3.6)
Investment in the two sectors satisfies
Kf,t+1 = (1− αs,t)At+1, (3.7)
Kb,t+1 = αs,tAt+1. (3.8)
Output is Cobb-Douglas with labor’s share equaling 1 − θ in each industry.
Farm output at time t, Ft, is given by
Ft = ZfK
θ
F,tL
1−θ
F,t . (3.9)
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A proportion, mt, of banking output is stolen or lost each period. Henceforth,
we reference such lost output simply as “stolen.” Non-stolen banking output
is, thus
Bt = (1−mt)ZbKθb,tL1−θb,t , (3.10)
and non-stolen output is
Y ut = Ft +Bt. (3.11)
Total output is
Yt = Ft + ZbK
θ
b,tL
1−θ
b,t . (3.12)
Returns to investing in farming and banking satisfy
rf,t = θZfK
θ−1
f,t L
1−θ
f,t , (3.13)
and
r˜b,t = (1−mt)θZbKθ−1b,t L1−θb,t . (3.14)
Agents invest in banking because the sector is more productive, i.e., Zb > Zf .
But, absent deposit insurance, they diversify due to the risk that banking
malfeasance is greater than expected. Malfeasance, mt, is the sum of two
components – its time-t mean, m¯t, plus an i.i.d. shock, t, i.e.,
mt = m¯t + t. (3.15)
Mean malfeasance is either high, m¯H , or low, m¯L, and obeys a Markov process.
If m¯t−1 = m¯H ,
m¯t =

m¯H with probability qH
m¯L with probability 1− qH .
(3.16)
If m¯t−1 = m¯L,
m¯t =

m¯H with probability qL
m¯L with probability 1− qL,
(3.17)
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where qH > qL. The additional shock, t+1, is uniformly distributed with the
same support, a and b, regardless of the state, i.e.,
t+1 ∼ U(a, b). (3.18)
When monitoring is feasible, households can pay to learn about this sec-
ond shock, t+1. Households observe the malfeasance share at t and infer
the current state of the world, st ∈ {L,H}, and the transition probability,
qs,t ∈ {qL, qH}. Their optimal allocation choice, αs,t, will change given this
information. A high state of malfeasance this period will likely persist lead-
ing households to invest less in banking. Given eqs. (3.1) to (3.8) and (3.13)
to (3.18), the optimal portfolio choice, αs,t, satisfies
0 =qs,t
∫ b
a
r˜Hb,t+1(αs,t, t+1)− rHf,t+1(αs,t, t+1)
1 + αs,tr˜Hb,t+1(αs,t, t+1) + (1− αs,t)rHf,t+1(αs,t, t+1)
dt+1 (3.19)
+(1− qs,t)
∫ b
a
r˜Lb,t+1(αs,t, t+1)− rLf,t+1(αs,t, t+1)
1 + αs,tr˜Lb,t+1(αs,t, t+1) + (1− αs,t)rLf,t+1(αs,t, t+1)
dt+1,
where superscripts reference expected returns if the high and low malfeasance
states arise at time t + 1.15 These returns depend on the malfeasance share
(both its mean at t+1 and t+1) as well as the allocation of capital to banking,
αs,t. Reduced forms for these returns are derived in appendix B.1.
Capital’s allocation between the two sectors is determined at the begin-
ning of each period based on agents’ portfolio choice. The allocation of labor,
in contrast, is determined at the end of each period such that workers earn
the same wage net of malfeasance in both sectors. This condition, our nor-
malization of total labor supply at 1 and the allocation of labor between the
two sectors are specified by
Lb,t + Lf,t = 1, (3.20)
15The first (second) term of eq. (3.19) captures the marginal effect on utility of increasing
the allocation to banking provided the mean malfeasance share at t+ 1 is high (low). Both
terms integrate over the possible realizations of t+1. The optimal choice of αs,t, must be
solved numerically. To rule out short-sales, we calibrate the model such that αs,t ∈ (0, 1).
61
wt = (1− θ)Zf (Kf,t/Lf,t)θ = (1− θ)Zb(1−mt)(Kb,t/Lb,t)θ, (3.21)
and
Lf,t =
Z
1
θ
f (1− αt−1)
[(1−mt)Zb]
1
θ αt−1 + Z
1
θ
f (1− αt−1)
, (3.22)
Lb,t =
[(1−mt)Zb]
1
θ αt−1
[(1−mt)Zb]
1
θ αt−1 + Z
1
θ
f (1− αt−1)
, (3.23)
where αt−1 references the portfolio share chosen at time t− 1.
3.4 Calibration
Table 4.3 reports our calibration. The time-preference factor, β, is set to 0.5
and capital’s share, θ, is set to 0.3. Our assumed mean malfeasance shares
are m¯H = .50 and m¯L = .22. The two assumed TFP levels are Zf = 10 and
Zb = 16. In combination, these parameters satisfy
(1− m¯H)Zb < Zf < (1− m¯L)Zb.
This restriction ensures interior solutions to the share of assets invested in
banks. We allow the shock, t+1, to raise or lower the malfeasance share by
.1, i.e., {a, b} = {−0.1, 0.1}. Finally, we set the probabilities of a high mean
malfeasance share at t+ 1 to be 0.6 when the mean malfeasance share is high
at time t and 0.4 when the mean malfeasance share is low at time t. I.e.,
qH = .6 and qL = .4.
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Parameter Description Value
β Time preference 0.5
θ Capital share 0.3
Zf Farm productivity 10
Zb Bank productivity 16
m¯H Mean malfeasance share in high malfeasance state 0.50
m¯L Mean malfeasance share in low malfeasance state 0.22
qH Probability of high malfeasance at t+ 1, given high malfeasance at t 0.6
qL Probability of high malfeasance at t+ 1, given low malfeasance at t 0.4
a Maximum reduction in malfeasance -0.1
b Maximum increase in malfeasance 0.1
Table 3.1: Parameter Values
3.5 Base Model Results
The model’s average values in its stochastic steady state are reported in ta-
ble 3.2. Table 3.3 and table 3.4 report averages for low and high mean malfea-
sance states, respectively. The values in these tables are based on a 10,020-
period transition. We simulated our model for 10, 020 periods, but consider
only data after the first 20 periods in tables 3.2 to 3.4. This removes the effect
of initial conditions. Assets at t = 0 in this simulation were set at the mean
level of assets arising in periods 21 through 10,020. m¯0 = m¯L. We iterated to
ensure that mean assets used for A0 equal mean assets over the 10,000 peri-
ods since the path of assets depends on A0. In simulating alternative banking
policies as well as private monitoring over 10,020 periods, we use the same
period-by-period draws of mean malfeasance and t.
Given our calibration, banking malfeasance has a major economic cost.
Across all states, 21.8 percent of output is stolen. In low mean malfeasance
states, 17.2 percent is stolen. In high mean malfeasance states, 27.2 percent is
stolen. Moreover, average non-stolen output when mean malfeasance is high
is 24.7 percent lower than when mean malfeasance is low. Since wages are
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proportional to output and consumption when young is proportion to wages,
both variables are also, on average, 24.7 percent lower in high compared to
low states. Consumption when old is only 15.5 percent lower across the two
types of states. The reason is that consumption when old includes not just the
income on assets, but the principal as well. And the principal is not impacted
by banker malfeasance.
Agents respond to bad times in banking by moving their assets into farm-
ing. When malfeasance is high, only 28 percent of assets are allocated to
banking. When low, the figure is 86 percent. We refer here to the value of
α, which determines capital’s allocation in the subsequent period. The share
of capital in the high state is larger – 54.9 percent, while the share in the
low state is smaller – 67.3 percent than suggested by these values for α. This
reflects the fact that the high (low) state emerges, in part, from states that
are low (high) in the prior period. But when agents see higher prospects for
bad (good) times, they take cover (leave their shelter) by setting their values
of α appropriately. The fact that agents cannot tell for sure what is coming
when it comes to the state of mean malfeasance means that capital is perpet-
ually mis-allocated. This is another economic cost arising from bad bankers
in addition to their direct theft of output and their general negative influence
on investment in banking. The misallocation of capital is partially offset by
the reallocation of labor. On average, banking accounts for 56 percent of total
employment. In periods of high mean malfeasance, this figure is 38 percent.
It is 74 percent when there is low mean malfeasance.
The average annualized return to investing in banking is 2.04 percent com-
pared with 2.01 percent in farming.16 Although their mean returns are similar,
as the table’s standard deviation of returns shows, investing in banking is far
riskier than investing in farming. This explains why farming always attracts
16In forming annualized returns, we assume each period corresponds to 30 years.
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a goodly share of investment.
Variable Mean Std. Min Max
Output Y 23.12 4.25 16.46 29.86
Non-Stolen Output 18.08 3.19 12.38 25.95
Consumption when Young Cy 6.33 1.11 4.33 9.08
Consumption when Old Co 11.75 1.78 8.85 16.51
Annualized Bank Returns 2.04 0.77 0.72 4.01
Annualized Farm Returns 2.01 0.58 0.94 3.52
Allocation to Banking α 0.57 0.29 0.28 0.87
Bank Capital Kb 3.88 2.42 1.20 7.93
Farm Capital Kf 2.45 1.47 0.84 4.60
Savings A 6.33 1.12 4.33 9.08
Bank Labor Lb 0.56 0.32 0.08 0.95
Wages w 12.66 2.23 8.67 18.16
Table 3.2: Average Values in Model’s Stochastic Steady State
Variable Mean Std. Min Max
Output Y 24.90 3.81 18.64 29.86
Non-Stolen Output 20.62 2.48 16.17 25.95
Consumption when Young Cy 7.22 0.87 5.66 9.08
Consumption when Old Co 12.74 1.79 9.24 16.51
Annualized Bank Returns 2.68 0.51 1.88 4.01
Annualized Farm Returns 1.53 0.34 0.94 2.3
Allocation to Banking α 0.86 0.01 0.85 0.87
Bank Capital Kb 4.41 2.39 1.21 7.85
Farm Capital Kf 2.14 1.44 0.84 4.60
Savings A 6.55 1.12 4.39 8.99
Bank Labor Lb 0.74 0.24 0.34 0.95
Wages w 14.44 1.74 11.32 18.16
Table 3.3: Average Values when Mean Malfeasance Share is Low at t
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Variable Mean Std. Min Max
Output Y 21.33 3.92 16.46 28.79
Non-Stolen Output 15.52 1.04 12.38 18.33
Consumption when Young Cy 5.43 0.37 4.33 6.41
Consumption when Old Co 10.76 1.08 8.85 14.00
Annualized Bank Returns 1.40 0.34 0.72 2.14
Annualized Farm Returns 2.48 0.30 1.84 3.52
Allocation to Banking α 0.28 0.00 0.28 0.28
Bank Capital Kb 3.34 2.34 1.20 7.93
Farm Capital Kf 2.76 1.44 0.85 4.58
Savings A 6.10 1.06 4.33 9.08
Bank Labor Lb 0.38 0.28 0.08 0.85
Wages w 10.87 0.73 8.67 12.83
Table 3.4: Average Values when Mean Malfeasance Share is High at t
Figure 3.1 plots returns in the two sectors for different values of t+1 and
realizations of the time-t+1 malfeasance state assuming At equals its average
value. The dotted red line shows returns, for different values of t+1, if the
malfeasance state at t + 1 is high. The solid black line shows returns, for
different values of t+1, if the malfeasance state at t + 1 is low. The top
panels shows annualized returns if the malfeasance state is high at time t.
The bottom panels shows returns if the malfeasance state is low at time t.
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Figure 3.1: Annualized Returns at t + 1 Conditional on the Shocks to the
Mean Malfeasance Share at t+ 1
The right-hand side panels show that higher malfeasance, whether caused
by a) moving to or staying in a high malfeasance state at t + 1 or b) a high
draw on t+1, implies lower returns to banking at t + 1; i.e., the dotted red
curves lie below the solid black curves and both slope downward.
The left-hand side panels show the opposite in the case of the returns to
farming. This reflects a greater allocation of labor to farming the greater
the share of malfeasance in banking. More labor in farming means a higher
marginal product of capital and, thus, a higher return. This effect of labor
moving into farming is stronger the smaller the degree of malfeasance at time
t — the case when relatively little capital will be invested in farming in t+ 1.
This explains the larger gap between the red and black curves in the bottom
left panel than in the top left panel.
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Figure 3.2: Histograms of Realized Returns conditional on Mean Malfeasance
State, m¯s
Figure 3.2 plots the distribution of realized returns in period t + 1 simu-
lated in the 10,000-periods referenced above. This figure, while organized like
Figure 3.1, incorporates changes in At from from period to period. The panels
on the right consider bank returns. Those on the left consider farm returns.
The top (bottom) panels consider returns at t+ 1 when the malfeasance state
is high (low) in period t. Finally, the red (black) histogram references high
(low) malfeasant states arising at time t + 1. The vertical bar shows mean
returns in each time t+ 1 state.
As expected, bank (farm) returns are lower (higher) at t+1 when the t+1
malfeasant state is high (low). The position of the histograms reflects different
allocations, at time t, in capital between the two sectors. The variance in the
histograms reflects the impact of movements of labor across sectors on the
return to capital in the two sectors. The impact on a sector’s return from
employing more labor is greater the smaller the initial allocation of capital to
that sector.
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Figure 3.3: Histograms of Assets, Non-Stolen Output and Returns to Banking
and Farming
Figure 3.3 shows histograms of non-stolen output, assets, annualized farm
and banking returns. The histograms’ results are unconditional, i.e., they
include both high and low malfeasance states in the prior period which explains
why they are multi-modal. They are also quite dispersed suggesting that
banking malfeasance can produce peaks and troughs in non-stolen output,
wages, and assets that are very far apart.
As expected, a switch in the mean malfeasance state from one period to
the next produces much greater changes in macro conditions than no switch.
Figure 3.4 records the transition beginning with high average malfeasance,
switching to low average malfeasance in period 3, and then switching back to
and remaining at high average malfeasance in periods 4 through 10. Figure 3.5
illustrates the opposite – i.e., a temporary switch from low to high and then
back to low average malfeasance. The path of the additional shock to the
malfeasance share, t, is kept at 0 in both transitions. Consider fig. 3.4. In
period 3, when mean banking malfeasance declines, more labor is allocated to
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banking and there is an increase in non-stolen output. But since the shock
hits after capital has been allocated, there is no immediate impact on the
capital stock. There is a major impact in period 4 reflecting agents’ decisions
to invest more in banking given its higher expected return. Given that high
mean malfeasance reoccurs in period 4, this investment decision is an ex-post
mistake. But once the capital is allocated, it cannot be reallocated. The
ex-post excessive investment in banking draws additional labor into banking.
Hence, there is a mis-allocation, again, on an ex-post basis, of labor as well
as capital.
Notwithstanding the additional capital and labor allocated to banking,
non-stolen output is smaller in period 4 than in, for example, period 2. The
fact that the economy is so different in period 4 from, for example, period 2
indicates the importance of beliefs about mean malfeasance – whether those
beliefs are correct or, as in this case, incorrect. Indeed, as a comparison of the
change in Yt between periods 2 and 3, on the one hand, and period 3 and 4, on
the other, shows, the change in beliefs about the malfeasance shock produces
larger output fluctuations than does the shock itself. Another interesting point
about the two impulse-response transitions is that one is not the obverse of
the other. Consider, for example, the impact on wages. In fig. 3.4, wages
rise above their initial value and then fall below it following the temporary
reduction in mean malfeasance. In contrast, in fig. 3.5 wages fall and gradually
return to their period-2 value following a temporary rise in mean malfeasance.
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Figure 3.4: The Economy’s Transition – High to Low to High Mean Malfea-
sance
Figure 3.5: The Economy’s Transition – Low to High to Low Mean Malfea-
sance
Figure 3.6 records a third controlled experiment, this one with a prolonged
improvement in mean malfeasance. Like the prior two, t is set to zero. The
economy starts with high mean malfeasance, followed by low mean malfea-
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sance for 6 periods, followed by high mean malfeasance for 2 periods. As a
comparison with fig. 3.5 shows, the economy’s path is highly sensitive to the
exact sequence of mean malfeasance shocks. This sensitivity, as we’ve seen,
reflects immediate impacts, but, more importantly, the formation of beliefs
about the economy’s future.
Figure 3.6: Transition to High Mean Malfeasance after Extended Low Mean
Malfeasance
Adding t shocks to the mean malfeasance share, we arrive at our baseline
transition, fig. 3.7. The path of these added shocks for the first 10 periods is
reported in table 3.5. We use the same path of shocks to mean malfeasance
and t in our comparisons below of the baseline economy with the baseline
economy augmented to include alternative government banking policies or
private monitoring.
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t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 −0.078 −0.050 0.093 0.026 0.063 0.013 0.027 0.062 0.085 0.083
Table 3.5: Path of t for First Ten Periods of Transition
Figure 3.7: Baseline Transition
3.6 Deposit Insurance
Deposit insurance insulates savers from losses due to bad bankers, leading to
exclusive investment in banking. If the mean share turns out to be low, the
insurance succeeds in generating more non-stolen output than would other-
wise arise if savers shied away from banks.17 But if the mean malfeasance
share turns out to be high, savers are actually worse off than without deposit
insurance. Yes, they are compensated for their loses, but they have to pay
taxes to cover the compensation. In short, since the share of malfeasance is an
aggregate risk, deposit insurance provides no real insurance in the aggregate.
Instead, it simply induces savers to invest exclusively in banking even in times
17This may explain why deposit insurance is often introduced during crises. Another
explanation is that voters do not internalize the need to pay taxes to cover insurance claims.
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when its highly risky from a macro prospective. Getting savers to over invest
in banking when they should engenders, of course, an excess burden.
Under deposit insurance, households receive
rDIb,t = (1−mt)θZbKθ−1b,t L1−θb,t +mtθZbKθ−1b,t L1−θb,t = θZbKθ−1b,t L1−θb,t . (3.24)
This is financed by a lump-sum tax, τDI,t, levied on the elderly to prevent
redistribution across generations.
co,t = At(1 + r
DI
b,t )− τDI,t, (3.25)
where
τDI,t = AtmtθZbK
θ−1
b,t L
1−θ
b,t . (3.26)
With deposit insurance, we have,
{Kf,t+1, Lf,t+1,Kb,t+1, Lb,t+1} = {0, 0, At+1, 1} (3.27)
Figure 3.8 shows the path of the economy with deposit insurance using the
same path of shocks as the baseline transition in fig. 3.6. Although total
output is higher, non-stolen output and consumption is lower in bad states.
Figure 3.8: Economy’s Transition With and Without Deposit Insurance.
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Table 3.6 compares deposit insurance to the baseline. All assets are, as
indicated, now allocated to banking in all periods. When the share of bad
bankers is low, non-stolen output, wages and consumption are higher. But
when the share is high, wages, consumption and saving are lower than would
be true absent deposit insurance.18 Thus, increased allocation to banking due
to deposit insurance increases the volatility of consumption and non-stolen
assets. This accords with findings of Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (1997,
1998, 2002).
Baseline Insurance % Change
Variable Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Output Y 23.12 4.25 27.44 2.26 +19 −47
Non-Stolen Output 18.08 3.19 17.71 4.75 −2 +49
Consumption when Young Cy 6.33 1.11 6.20 1.66 −2 +49
Consumption when Old Co 11.75 1.78 11.51 2.66 −2 +49
Annualized Bank Returns 2.04 0.77 2.94 0.39 +44 −50
Annualized Farm Returns 2.01 0.58 - - −100 −100
Allocation to Banking α 0.57 0.29 1.00 0.00 +75 −100
Bank Capital Kb 3.88 2.42 6.19 1.66 +60 −31
Farm Capital Kf 2.45 1.47 0.00 0.00 −100 −100
Savings A 6.33 1.12 6.19 1.66 −2 +49
Bank Labor Lb 0.56 0.32 1.00 0.00 +77 −100
Wages w 12.66 2.23 12.40 3.32 −2 +49
Table 3.6: Average Values with Deposit Insurance
We next calculate the factor, λ, needed to compensate both the old and
the young, in all states, to make their expected utility in the baseline, denoted
EUs,t, equal to their expected utility under deposit insurance, denoted EU
′
s,t,
EU ′s,t =β log λcy,t + (1− β)
∫ b
a
{qs,t log λco,t+1(m¯H , t+1) + (1− qs,t) log λco,t+1(m¯L, t+1)} 1
b− adt+1,
(3.28)
=EUs,t + log λ.
18With all output being produced in the banking sector, more output is lost when the
share of bad bankers is high.
75
Hence λ = exp(EU ′s,t−EUs,t). Expected lifetime utility in the model’s stochas-
tic steady state is measured by average realized lifetime utility over 10,000 suc-
cessive generations born after the 20th period of the transition. For deposit
insurance, the value of λ is 1.041 implying households must be compensated
with 4.1 percent more consumption in all states to make them as well off
as under the baseline case. Stated differently, the excess burden of deposit
insurance is a sizable 4.1 percent of consumption.
3.7 Monitoring Banks
3.7.1 Private Monitoring
As the behavior of rating companies leading up to the 2008 crisis showed, bank-
funded monitoring suffers from the “ratings shopping” examined in Skreta
and Veldkamp (2009a); Sangiorgi, Sokobin, and S. Spatt (2009) and Bolton,
Freixas, and Shapiro (2012). Even if we assume ratings are unbiased, they
may be too imprecise to help (Goel and Thakor (2015); Doherty, Kartasheva,
and Phillips (2009)).19 As an alternative, we consider monitoring financed by
investors, that is, by households. Specifically, we assume young agents can
purchase a report that indicates, with probability p, the realization of t+1.
20
With probability (1 − p) no information is gained. In this case, agents make
uninformed investment choices.
Let nt be the percentage of wage income spent on reports. We assume
additional expenditure increases the likelihood of receiving information, p,
with decreasing marginal effect,21 i.e., p = p(nt), where p(0) = 0, p(∞) = 1,
19In our model, this is analogous to assuming households cannot determine the accuracy
(or honesty) of a rating paid for by banks.
20Thus, informed agents know the malfeasance share at t+ 1 will be either m¯H + t+1 or
m¯L + t+1.
21This can be micro-founded by assuming that nt buys many reports with each providing
a noisy estimate of the true realization of the shock, t+1. With likelihood, p(x¯|t+1), where
x¯ is the mean estimate given n reports, the precision of the estimate will be increasing in n,
parameterized by the variance of the data-generating process for the reports.
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p′(n) > 0 and p′′(n) < 0, which we capture via22
p(nt) =
100nt
100nt + 1
. (3.29)
Households purchase the welfare-maximizing quantity of information, nt. Re-
turns to capital depend on the aggregate allocation to banking, designated by
a bar, which depends on the mix of the two types of agents, informed and
uninformed, per
α¯s,t(t+1) = pαI,s,t(t+1) + (1− p)αU,s,t, (3.30)
where αI,s,t(t+1) is the asset allocation of informed agents and αU,s,t is the
asset allocation of uninformed agents. With probability p(nt), individuals
receive information about t+1 and allocate according to
0 =qs,t
r˜Hb,t+1(α¯s,t, t+1)− rHf,t+1(α¯s,t, t+1)
1 + αs,tr˜Hb,t+1(α¯s,t, t+1) + (1− αs,t)rHf,t+1(α¯s,t, t+1)
(3.31)
+(1− qs,t)
r˜Lb,t+1(α¯s,t, t+1)− rLf,t+1(α¯s,t, t+1)
1 + αs,tr˜Lb,t+1(α¯s,t, t+1) + (1− αs,t)rLf,t+1(α¯s,t, t+1)
,
where subscript s ∈ {L,H} indicates the state at t.23
With probability [1 − p(nt)], individuals purchase reports, but receive no
information. Their optimal allocation choice, αU,s,t, solves a similar first-
order condition to the no-monitoring case (eq. (3.19)) by integrating over the
support of t+1 and the possibility of the two states of the world next period,
high and low. All returns are evaluated using aggregate allocation α¯s,t(t+1)
given by eq. (3.30).
0 =qs,t
∫ b
a
rHf,t+1(α¯s,t, t+1)− r˜Hb,t+1(α¯s,t, t+1)
1 + (1− αU,s,t)rHf,t+1(α¯s,t, t+1) + αU,s,tr˜Hb,t+1(α¯s,t, t+1)
dt+1
(3.32)
+(1− qs,t)
∫ b
a
rLf,t+1(α¯s,t, t+1)− r˜Lb,t+1(α¯s,t, t+1)
1 + (1− αU,s,t)rLf,t+1(α¯s,t, t+1) + αU,s,tr˜Lb,t+1(α¯s,t, t+1)
dt+1.
22The coefficient, 100, is chosen so that households can spend one percent of income on
monitoring and receive information fifty percent of the time. This is sufficient to induce
households to monitor.
23In (eq. (3.31)), we reference α¯s,t rather than α¯s,t(t+1) to limit notation.
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To recapitulate, with monitoring, households learn with probability p(nt) the
realization of t+1 and choose the optimal allocation, αI,s,t(t+1), which solves
eq. (3.31). With probability [1 − p(nt)], households receive no information
and and make an uninformed allocation, αU,s,t, which is the implicit solution
to eq. (3.32). Both solutions must be solved simultaneously. The solution is
detailed in appendix B.2. Optimal expenditure on monitoring, nt, is chosen
to maximize expected utility
EU(nt) =β log cy,t(1− nt) + (1− β) logAt+1(1− nt) (3.33)
+p(nt)(1− β)
∫ b
−a
{
qs,t logR
H
I,t+1(t+1) + (1− qs,t) logRLI,t+1(t+1)
} 1
b− adt+1
+ [1− p(nt)](1− β)
∫ b
−a
{
qs,t logR
H
U,t+1(t+1) + (1− qs,t) logRLU,t+1(t+1)
} 1
b− adt+1,
where the gross portfolio return if informed, given state S and t+1, is
RSI,t+1(t+1) = 1+[1− αI,s,t(t+1)] rSf,t+1(α¯s,t(t+1), t+1)+αI,s,t(t+1)rSb,t+1(α¯s,t(t+1), t+1),
(3.34)
and the gross portfolio return if uninformed, given state S and t+1, is
RSU,t+1(t+1) = 1+[1− αU,s,t] rSf,t+1(α¯s,t(t+1), t+1)+αU,s,trSb,t+1(α¯s,t(t+1), t+1).
(3.35)
In eq. (3.33), the first two terms account for the sure cost to consumption
when young and old. The third and fourth terms represent the net gains from
monitoring.
Under our calibration, if mean malfeasance is low at time t, households
spend 1.13 percent of their income on learning t+1. This corresponds to a
53.1 percent chance of learning the true potential bad-bank share. If mean
malfeasance is high at time t, households do not find it optimal to monitor.
This is because the state of mean malfeasance affects returns more than the
realization of t+1 so learning is of less value when malfeasance is likely to be
high at t+ 1.
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When monitoring is optimal at time t (i.e., when the time-t mean malfea-
sance state is low), table 3.7 shows that information on an impending negative
shock to t+1 reduces investment in banking, on average, to 45 percent of sav-
ings. News of a positive shock triggers a corner solution and individuals invest
all their assets in banking, as opposed to an average of 86 percent in the no-
monitoring case. The effect of informed individuals on the aggregate allocation
also makes this corner solution optimal even for agents for whom monitoring
generates no information.
Average allocation
to banking
Informed of
increased stealing
t+1 > 0
No information
on t+1
Informed of
decreased stealing
t+1 < 0
αH,t − 0.28 −
αL,t 0.45 1.00 1.00
Table 3.7: Effect of Information on Allocation to Banking.
Figure 3.9 and table 3.8 show that monitoring makes relatively little differ-
ence to the economy. Consumption when young and old does tend to be higher
with monitoring. But the equilibrium is inefficient as agents replicate their
efforts to learn the value of t+1. Moreover, the downside to early information
is more economic volatility. Still, calculated as a compensating variation using
eq. (3.28), households are 1.2 per cent better off in terms of lifetime expected
utility than in the baseline if they can monitor. Relative to deposit insurance,
however, monitoring improves welfare by 5.4 per cent. This is a substantial
differential. Unfortunately, monitoring can suffer from free-riding.
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Figure 3.9: An Example Transition With and Without Monitoring
Baseline Monitoring % Change
Variable Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Output Y 23.12 4.25 23.16 4.56 0 +7
Unstolen Output 18.08 3.19 18.31 3.24 +1 +2
Consumption when Young Cy 6.33 1.11 6.41 1.13 +1 +2
Consumption when Old Co 11.75 1.78 11.9 1.83 +1 +3
Annualized Bank Returns 2.04 0.77 2.01 0.78 −2 +1
Annualized Farm Returns 2.01 0.58 1.96 0.53 −2 −7
Allocation to Banking α 0.57 0.29 0.57 0.32 0 +10
Bank Capital Kb 3.88 2.42 3.93 2.63 +1 +9
Farm Capital Kf 2.45 1.47 2.48 1.77 +1 +20
Savings A 6.33 1.12 6.41 1.14 1 +2
Bank Labor Lb 0.56 0.32 0.56 0.35 −1 +10
Wages w 12.66 2.23 12.82 2.27 +1 +2
Table 3.8: Average Values with Monitoring
3.7.2 Information as a Public Good
Previously, report results were assumed to be private. We now allow some
households who did not receive information to learn the value of t+1 at zero
cost with probability l. The decision to purchase reports takes into account
the probability of receiving information for free. The probability of receiving
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information is now d
d(nt) = l + (1− l)p(nt) (3.36)
Households take l as given. The marginal increase in the probability of
learning the value of t+1 from purchasing an additional report is now reduced
based on the extent of these leaks, i.e.,
∂d
∂nt
= p′(nt)(1− l). (3.37)
Clearly, as the fraction of leaked reports, l, increases, the marginal benefit
of purchasing reports decreases. This leads to fewer reports in equilibrium.
Figure 3.10 illustrates how the prospect of learning the true value for free
reduces private monitoring.
Figure 3.10: The Effect of Free Reports on Monitoring Expenditure
If households expect the probability of a leak to be above 0.8, only .02
percent of wages is spent on monitoring, yielding a probability of learning of
just .02. Sufficiently high free-riding eliminates monitoring, i.e., the economy
reverts to the baseline case where no information on the realization of t+1
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is available. The free-riding problem of investor-funded ratings is noted in
Warwick Commission (2009).
3.8 Regulation Through Disclosure
Suppose the government can pay a cost to reduce the average malfeasance
share by φ, replacing eq. (3.15) with
mt = (m¯t − φ) + t+1. (3.38)
To pay for this, we impose a lump sum tax on the old equivalent to the average
cost of deposit insurance, τDisc,t = τ¯DI = 2.93 or 12.7 percent of output.
co,t+1 = At+1[1 + (1− αt)rf,t+1 + αtr˜b,t+1]− τDisc,t. (3.39)
Figure 3.11 considers the impact of this expenditure assuming the government
is able to reduce malfeasance by either φ = 0.2 or φ = 0.4 after spending τDisc,t.
Recall that m¯s is either m¯H = 0.50 or m¯L = 0.22. The comparison economy
is that with deposit insurance.
Figure 3.11: Economies with Low and High Disclosure and Deposit Insurance.
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Disclosure raises non-stolen output, wages, capital formation and con-
sumption. Increasing the share of honest bankers encourages households to
enter the banking sector in much the same way as deposit insurance. However,
deposit insurance does nothing to eliminate fraud. As expected, the economy
does far better if government disclosure is high. Average results for both levels
of disclosure are reported in tables 3.9 and 3.10.
Baseline Low Disclosure % Change
Variable Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Output Y 23.12 4.25 30.94 1.92 +34 −55
Non-Stolen Output 18.08 3.19 26.14 5.33 +45 +67
Consumption when Young Cy 6.33 1.11 9.15 1.87 +45 +67
Consumption when Old Co 11.75 1.78 14.06 2.99 +20 +68
Annualized Bank Returns 2.04 0.77 2.11 0.33 +3 −57
Annualized Farm Returns 2.01 0.58 - - −100 −100
Allocation to Banking α 0.57 0.29 1.00 0.00 +75 −100
Bank Capital Kb 3.88 2.42 9.14 1.87 +136 −23
Farm Capital Kf 2.45 1.47 0.00 0.00 −100 −100
Savings A 6.33 1.12 9.14 1.87 +44 +67
Bank Labor Lb 0.56 0.32 1.00 0.00 +77 −100
Wages w 12.66 2.23 18.30 3.73 +45 +67
Table 3.9: Average Values with Low levels of Disclosure, φ = 0.2
Baseline High Disclosure % Change
Variable Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Output Y 23.12 4.25 32.75 0.88 +42 −79
Non-Stolen Output 18.08 3.19 31.20 2.79 +73 −12
Consumption when Young Cy 6.33 1.11 10.92 0.98 +73 −12
Consumption when Old Co 11.75 1.78 17.35 1.54 +48 −14
Annualized Bank Returns 2.04 0.77 2.09 0.15 +2 −81
Annualized Farm Returns 2.01 0.58 - - −100 −100
Allocation to Banking α 0.57 0.29 1.00 0.00 +75 −100
Bank Capital Kb 3.88 2.42 10.92 0.98 +181 −60
Farm Capital Kf 2.45 1.47 0.00 0.00 −100 −100
Savings A 6.33 1.12 10.92 0.98 +73 −12
Bank Labor Lb 0.56 0.32 1.00 0.00 +77 −100
Wages w 12.66 2.23 21.84 1.96 +73 −12
Table 3.10: Average values with High Levels of Disclosure, φ = 0.4
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Figure 3.12 compares average output, non-stolen output and lifetime con-
sumption in the regimes discussed. Deposit insurance boosts output, but
not non-stolen output or consumption. Monitoring, even ignoring free rid-
ing, makes little difference to the equilibrium. Low disclosure references a
government-instigated reduction in the share of bad bankers of φ = 0.2. This
reduces non-stolen output and consumption considerably despite the high cost
of regulation, assumed to be equal to the cost of deposit insurance. High dis-
closure, reducing the malfeasance share by φ = 0.4, produces further gains.
The downside to a modest reduction in malfeasance is that it encourages
investment in banking while still permitting shocks to malfeasance to cause
volatility. Volatility under limited disclosure is similar to that under deposit
insurance. This is illustrated in fig. 3.13, which depicts the standard deviation
of key variables compared to the baseline. Significant disclosure solves this
problem.
Figure 3.12: Comparing Means of Aggregates in Different Regimes.
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Figure 3.13: Comparing Variability of Aggregates in Different Regimes.
Table 3.11 reports compensating variations. They are calculated as the
percentage change in consumption, in all states, needed to produce the same
expected utility as in the baseline, measured by averaging realized lifetime
utility over 10,000 generations beginning after the economy has been operating
for 20 periods.24 The table shows that, compared with the baseline, deposit
insurance is 4.1 percent less efficient, monitoring is 1.2 percent more efficient,
a low level of government disclosure is 23.3 percent more efficient, and a high
level of government disclosure is 37.9 percent more efficient.
Regime Percentage Compensating Differential
Deposit insurance -4.1%
Monitoring 1.2%
Low disclosure, φ = 0.2 23.3%
High disclosure, φ = 0.4 37.9%
Table 3.11: Percentage Compensating Variations
24In making these calculations we consider the same sequence of shocks for each setting.
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3.9 Conclusion
Banking crisis, throughout the ages, have been precipitated by the exposure
of bad/malfeasant banks (bankers). This news leads the public to defund the
banks, often precipitously, which is termed a liquidity crisis. Under this, our
paper’s view, liquidity crises are the result of, not the cause of financial re-
trenchment with its attendant economic decline. The medium for financial
malfeasance in all its manifestations is financial opacity. Leading up to 2008,
opacity provided full cover for liar loans, no-doc loans, NINJA loans, Mad-
off’s swindle, originate-to-distribute abuses, CDOs-squared and other highly
complex tranched derivatives, unreported CDS positions, ratings shopping,
failures (with government approval) to mark assets to market25 and the list
goes on. The revelation of financial fraud amidst the financial fog produced
the rush to liquidity that eventuated in the downfall of so many high profile
banks. Had there been no malfeasance there likely would have been no crisis.
If, as modeled here, the revelation of “good” bankers gone bad rather
than of bad things happening to good banks is the source of financial crisis,
dramatically expanding the government’s role in verification and disclosure of
assets may be the answer. This prescription is the polar opposite of those
who tout opacity as essential for maintaining liquidity of bank liabilities. The
difference in perspective arises in the case of counterfeit currency. If no one
knows that some currency is counterfeit, both bad and good currency will
be sources of liquidity. Disclosing the counterfeits can produce a run on,
actually, a run away from the currency. Is society better off suppressing news
of the counterfeits and letting them continue to circulate? Doing so maintains
liquidity, but permits ongoing theft and risks financial panic if news leaks out.
The answer, in practice, is no. Counterfeiters are disclosed and prosecuted as
a public service.
25See Andolfatto and Martin (2013)
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No one would expect private citizens to actively investigate counterfeiters.
But when it comes to banking, many have faulted investors, the vast majority
of whom are quite small, for failing to keep track of their banks’ behavior.
Indeed, the central premise of Dodd-Frank – that public funds will no longer
be used to bail out private banks – appears predicated on the assumption that
investors, knowing they are at risk, will better monitor their financial institu-
tions. This flies in the face of the free riding problem. Just as government is
needed to monitor, uncover, and disclose counterfeiting, our model suggests
that government is needed to verify and disclose, in real time, all bank assets
and liabilities.
Chapter 4
A Tale of Two Bailouts
Capital losses from government investments during the crisis
turned out to be smaller than expected. Funding costs from these
investments were reduced by quantitative easing but include a bill,
yet to be paid, from unwinding QE. We estimate the cost of both,
in real terms, for the U.S. and U.K. We are careful to separate fees
from services rendered, such as insurance provision and underwrit-
ing, from repayments. The US bailout is dominated by the effect
of the GSEs, without whom, the program would have made losses.
The UK bailout is dominated by the funding arrangement with the
Bank of England by which it receives payments today which will
be reversed later. In both countries, the funding rate paid by banks
is significantly lower than the rate paid to bank equity during the
same period, with adverse consequences for incentives. We model
the drag on growth due to government indebtedness as a result of
actions taken during the GFC. We advocate and model a market
solution to prevent crises known as ‘narrow banking’.
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4.1 Introduction
A decade on since recapitalization of banks in 2008, we are in a position to
calculate the taxpayer’s return on investment. This Chapter has 3 parts. The
first part is a discussion of the effect of large scale bond purchases ($2.3 trillion
(11.6% GDP) in the US, £435 bn (22% GDP) in the UK) in reducing the
cost of funding the emergency bank recapitalization programmes. However,
because government bonds were bought ‘above par’ so as to reduce the rate,
unwinding these schemes will invoke a considerable cost proportionate to the
stock of bonds outstanding. In section 4.2, we illustrate this little-known cost
and use Bank of England projections to estimate the QE ‘exit bill’.
The second part uses data from SEC filings in the US1 and annual reports
of the British government holding company, UKFI Ltd, to track payments
between governments and financial intermediaries.2 Unlike Treasury reports,
we include the effects of inflation and are careful to separate fees received as
the result of a separate program to underwrite bank liabilities. The coverage
of these guarantees was staggering and led to taxpayers taking on huge risk3
Fortunately, much of this insurance did not need to pay out as many banks
were averted from failure, due in large part to recapitalization program. Pro-
ceeds from this guarantee programs of $10.9bn in the USA and £5.2bn in the
UK (Schich (2009)) do not relate to the recapitalization programs and reflect
risk taken by the taxpayer. Section 4.3 reports the results. In the U.S., we
agree with headline results that these programs have been profitable, even in
1We thank Paul Kiel at ProPublica for making the data available.
2Figures are verified using Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Office of Budget
Responsibility (OBR) reports in each country.
3The Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program of the F.D.I.C. offered loan guar-
antees on $345.8bn of bank debt. In addition, Bank of America obtained $100bn of
guarantees and Citigroup $306bn guarantees. The program closed, with no payment
made, on 23 December 2009. The U.K. government also temporarily underwrote all
new bank debt with £250bn guarantees. In addition, the Asset Protection Scheme cov-
ered £280 billion of the government controlled RBS. The UK government estimates that
peak coverage was £1,029bn or 61% of 2009 GDP. https://www.nao.org.uk/highlights/
taxpayer-support-for-uk-banks-faqs/.
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real terms. In the U.K., the government’s stake in the Royal Bank of Scotland
is yet to be sold, but will likely make a large loss, rendering the whole program
loss-making. In both countries, returns are below the average return on bank
equity during the same period. The aim of producing figures on funding costs
during the crisis is to be mindful of its effects on incentives. Bank executives
can reasonably use these figures to forecast the cost of funding in the event
of another crisis, which they can weigh against potential reward. Given that
funding costs were not high, such rates imply it is profitable for banks to bet
heavily on risky assets when an economic boom arrives. Macro-prudential
policy should be aware that counter-cyclical buffers may have to be large to
combat this change in incentive. This will happen at exactly the time it will
be difficult to do so, for fear of stalling a nascent recovery.
In Section 4.4, we provide a theoretical model of a narrow banking system4
where government assistance is ruled out. Liquidity is provided by narrow
banks who may only hold government bonds. We compare a system with
a government guarantee policy. Our results capture both the regressive na-
ture of the government guarantee policy and the tax burden it implies. An
argument that runs through Treasury reports is that the aim of emergency
recapitalization was not investment but stabilization. Even negative returns
are preferable to the ‘melt-down’ scenario which would have occurred without
the policy. However, this is a counter-factual scenario conditional on balance
sheet position of banks in 2008. Prior to the GFC, banks priced in the fact
that the Federal Reserve had previously intervened to prevent failure. For
example, Continental Illinois received federal funds in 1984 to ensure bond-
holders did make losses and Long Term Capital Management were able to
reject a private deal in favor of a Fed loan in 1998 (Van Duyne, Brewster, and
Tett (2008)). Given bank leverage at the time, a decision to not intervene
4See Fisher (1935); Tobin (1987); Friedman (1960); Kay et al. (2010); Benes and Kumhof
(2012); Cochrane (2014); Pennacchi (2012).
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allow banks to fail is likely to have lead to a dramatic loss in confidence as
was feared at the time. However, the unconditional counter-factual is to com-
pare to a scenario where banks did not expect assistance and took sufficient
precautions to prevent their failure.
4.2 Quantitative Easing
Normalization requires either selling the bonds purchased during QE or al-
lowing the bonds to mature, equivalent to ‘selling’ the bond for its face, or
‘par’, value. Central Banks then ‘destroy’ cash received in exchange for these
bonds, reducing the money supply. The real return to these bond holdings is
the difference in price after taking into account coupon payments and infla-
tion. As the purpose of QE is to drive up prices by mass buying, the price paid
was high. Similarly, the price these bonds sell for could be low, depending on
how fast the reverse QE is conducted and the response of financial markets.
Central banks could well make large losses on these investments.
Of course, profit was not the aim of QE but the cost must be accounted
for. Treasury reports compare these costs to the counterfactual of the Great
Depression, when such interventions were not undertaken and the economy
suffered. We posit that the true counterfactual is an economy in which mea-
sures had been taken to prevent catastrophic bank loss in the first place.
Certainly, the swift response of central banks worldwide in 2008 to 2009 pre-
vented a far worse outcome. However, this is because investors expected to
be rescued and no system was in place to maintain liquidity throughout bank
failures. Indeed, by providing capital on favourable terms, governments have
demonstrated the power of the ‘Too Important To Fail’ to extract emergency
support.5.
5Brewer III and Jagtiani (2013), Freixas and Rochet (2008)) suggests this policy encour-
ages mergers so that banks become “systemically important”. Minsky (1986) argues that
such policies create ‘perceptions of safety’ which leads to further financial instability.
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If reverse QE is conducted by simply allowing bonds to mature, the return
will be the difference in price paid and the face value of the bonds.
4.2.1 US
In the USA, QE is often referred to as “Large scale asset purchases”, which
is carried out by SOMA (System Open Market Account Holdings), the New
York based Federal Reserve agency for the conduct of open market operations.
The policy has been rather different in the US than in the UK, mainly because
in the US a large part of assets purchased have been mortgage debt, either
purchased directly from the two Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs)
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae6, or in the form of Mortgage Backed Securities
(MBS). In 2018, these two assets accounted for over 42% of SOMA assets.
Prior to QE, SOMA assets had totalled $650bn in 2003 and $750bn in
2006. The assets in this period were mainly treasury notes and Bonds7 (62%)
, treasury Bills (36%) and the rest TIPS8 (2%), held for the conduct of open
market operations. Unlike the UK, the Federal Reserve is not restricted in
its ability to directly buy government assets, and so no new institution like
the Asset Purchase Facility needed to be set up to conduct QE. QE in the
US was implemented in three waves . In 2008, the assets of SOMA fell to
a low of less than $500bn, as the Fed reduced its holdings of Treasury Bills
from $227bn to just $18.4bn. The QE started at the end of 2008, firstly with
an increase in Treasury notes and bonds (TNB) followed by a larger increase
in MBS in early 2009, with Treasury bills held constant. The total assets of
SOMA stood at about $2 trillion from March 2010 to the end of that year,
with MBS almost reaching 55% of the total in July 2010. QE2 started in
6The official names are Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) and Federal
National Mortgage Association (FNMA)
7Treasury Bonds have a maturity of 30 years. Treasury Notes maturities of 2,3,5 or 10
years.
8Treasury Inflation Protected Securities, with maturities of 5,10 or 30 years.
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late 2010 and ended in mid-2011, with large scale purchases of Treasury notes
and bills of $600bn. By June 2011, the SOMA assets stood at $2.6 trillion9.
QE3 took a different form to the previous two rounds: it was an open ended
commitment to purchase $40bn assets per month which was later raised to
$80bn. The purchases commenced in April 2013 and continued until October
2014, bringing total SOMA assets to $4.2 trillion, where it has remained to
the present day. QE3 saw an increase in holdings of both TNB and MBS. In
February 2018 55% of SOMA assets were TNB, 42% MBS with 2.7% in TIPS
and the rest in other assets. Since US nominal annualized GDP in the last
quarter of 2017at $19.7 trillion, QE represented 21% of US GDP.
Total federal debt is $20.9 trillion, of which $5.7 trillion is held by govern-
ment institutions (social security being the largest, along with various retire-
ment funds and medicare). The remaining $15.2 trillion is classified as “Debt
held by the public” (DHBP) which includes the Fed’s SOMA assets10 . Hence
SOMA assets represent about 15.7% of DHBP (which excludes the holdings
of MBS).
The Fed was started paying interest on its reserves in 2008 (called ”Interest
on Excess Reserves”), for which new legislation was required from Congress
11. The rate was 0.25% until 2015, since when it has been raised as a floor to
the FOMC target rate. Since June 14th 2018 the IOER is 1.95%.
The Fed has outlined its plan for the Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet
Normalization in several policy documents, the most recent being in January
2018.
9For details of QE 1 and 2, see Ihrig et al (2012), Expectations about the Fed-
eral Reserve’s Balance Sheet and the Term Structure of Interest Rates, https://www.
federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2012/201257/201257pap.pdf
10For most recent figures see https://treasurydirect.gov/NP/debt/current. The fig-
ures in the text were valid on March 2nd 2018
11The Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 allowed for this to start in 2011.
It was bought forward in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.
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In September 2014, The FOMC outlined the process of normalization. The
general principles can be summarised as:
1. The Federal funds rate will gradually be raised to its target by raising
the rate it pays on central bank reserves.
2. “The Committee intends to reduce the Federal Reserve’s securities hold-
ings in a gradual and predictable manner primarily by ceasing to reinvest
repayments of principal on securities held in the SOMA.”
3. The FOMC does not intend to reduce holdings of MBS. If it does decide
to do so, it will be announced in advance.
4. “The Committee intends to reduce the Federal Reserve’s securities hold-
ings in a gradual and predictable manner primarily by ceasing to reinvest
repayments of principal on securities held in the SOMA.”
The first step was undertaken in December 2015 when the Federal pol-
icy rate target range was increased from 0.00-0.25% to 0.25-0.5%, with five
subsequent rises taking the range to 1.5-1.75% by March 201812.
In 2017, the plan took more shape, as explained in a release on November
9th13. There was to be tapering of re-investment of sales with re-investment
being done only when resales exceeded a cap (initially $6bn rising to $30bn
per month) and also extending the tapering of re-investment to MBS (starting
at $4bn and rising to $20bn per month). The FOMC also made explicit that
whilst reserve balances would decrease significantly as securities holdings are
reduced, the demand for reserves would probably be greater than prior to the
crisis.
12https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/
monetary20180321a.htm
13FOMC Communications related to Policy Normalization, November 9th 2017. This
includes earlier minutes decisions https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
policy-normalization.htm
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Figure 4.1: SOMA
4.2.2 UK
QE was introduced in March 2009, as a method of reducing long-term interest
rates. The official policy “Bank Rate” is a short-term interest rate. This
was reduced to 0.5 in 2008. QE was seen as a way of forcing down longer
run interest rates: by purchasing bonds it raised their price and hence lowers
interest rates.
The formal framework for achieving this was to set up the Asset Purchase
Facility (APF): the Bank of England created reserves, which it loaned to the
APF for the purpose of purchasing assets under the QE scheme (for most
stages of QE, the assets have been predominantly government bonds). Since
central; Bank reserves never rarely leave the Bank, the asset-purchases by
the APF resulted in equivalent increases in central bank reserve holdings by
commercial banks (the mechanism being that when the bonds were purchased,
the bank accounts of the bond-sellers were credited and the reserves moved
from the APF). The decisions about QE were taken by the Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC), to be carried out by the APF. However, the Treasury (HM
government) indemnifies the whole operation and is responsible for the profits
95
Income £m 2015-16 Balance sheet
Interest received 18 Assets
Net gains (losses) on financial instruments 6,652 Cash 1,332
Coupon income received 14,032 Debt Securities 413,346
Total Income 20,702 Total Assets 414,668
Expenditure Liabilities
Interest paid on loan from BoE -1,881 Loans and other Borrowings 375,326
Admin -2 Due to Treasury under indemnity 39,342
Indemnity due to (from) Treasury -18,819 Total Liabilities. 414,668
Total Expenses -20,702
or losses resulting from QE.
The financial flows between the Bank of England, the APF and the Trea-
sury are as follows. The bank pays the coupons on the bonds owned by the
APF to the APF. These constitute the revenue of the APF. After costs, the
APF then pays interest on its loan to the Bank of England. The Bank of
England then uses this to pay interest (at the policy rate) on central bank
reserves (central Bank reserves are approximately equal to the loan to the
APF). The excess is paid back to the Treasury by the APF under the heading
“Net indemnity to HM Treasury”. This means that one of the effects of QE
in the short-run is to improve government finances. In effect, the Treasury is
currently only paying 0.25% on that part of its debt owned by the APF. If
the debt were still in private hands, the coupons would be based on market
conditions prior to QE and would be larger. The 2015-2016 financial state-
ment from the APF has the following figures for the magnitudes of these flows
and corresponding stocks14: The benefits of QE to the government finances
are not fully captured by the money-go-round captured in the APF income-
expenditure statement. Normal government bonds issued since the advent of
QE will also have a lower interest rate. The low long-term interest rates that
QE has bought about greatly aid the government in terms of its re-financing
14Annual Report 2015/16, Asset purchase facility fund limited, http:
//www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/markets/apf/
boeapfannualreport1606.pdf.
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needs and funding of deficits.
4.2.3 Unwinding QE
However, a nasty cost will need to be paid when QE is reversed and the balance
sheet run down or “normalized”, although the story is somewhat different in
the UK and US for various reasons we will discuss. Essentially, unwinding
QE is the reverse of the initial expansion. We will first consider the UK case
in detail. It is first worth noting that unlike the US, the UK MPC has not
outlined a plan for unwinding QE. Whilst it is widely assumed that the Bank
of England will implement something similar to the Fed plan, there has been
no clear road-map and even the basic step 1 (raise interest rates) has been
promised, delayed and promised again with no clear forward guidance given.
Of course, the Brexit process was initiated with the referendum in June 2016,
but as of 21 June 2018 the interest rate remains at 0.5%, the same level it
was in March 2009. Whilst individual members of the MPC have called for
unwinding15, the subject has scarcely been touched on in the MPC minutes.
The APF can sell bonds to the private sector. The APF then uses this
cash to pay off the loan from the Bank, resulting in a canceling out of central
Bank reserves. To see how this works, when investors buy the bonds, their
private sector banks will pay the cash to the APF resulting in a fall in private
banks’ reserves at the central bank equal in value to the purchase price of the
bond. However, this process can lead to a cost because the long-term interest
rate on the bonds will be higher when the bonds are sold. The process of
asset purchases was started once the policy interest rate was at 0.5%, and the
process of sale will not start until the policy rate has risen to a value of perhaps
1.5% (if we take the American experience as a model). Furthermore, the act
of selling bonds will probably exert a downward pressure on bond prices.
15see for example https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/
bank-of-england-quantative-easing-programme-end-435-billion-ian-mcafferty-interest-rates-qe-a7838581.
html
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To illustrate this most simply, suppose we have a consol, which pays a
fixed amount in perpetuity. Its market value is simply the annual rate divided
by the interest rate. Take a £100 pound annual coupon. With interest rates
at 0.5%, this is worth £20,000. However, if the interest rate rises to 4% as
bonds are sold, this is worth only £2,500. There is a large potential loss as
the unwinding of QE leads to higher interest rates. Indeed, even if QE is not
unwound, but the short term policy rate is raised and this leads to a rise in
long-term rates there is still a loss in terms of the change in the value of the
asset on the balance sheet. In practice, the calculation of this loss is rather
more complicated than the simple example of consuls: each bond is a schedule
of payments stretching over a period of time (as long as 30 years) and bonds
are at different stages in their life-cycle. However, the losses involved will be
very large.
At the end of 2012, the APF started to pay the coupon payments from
the Treasury on its bonds back to the treasury16. Prior to this, the Bank of
England had been saving the coupons so that it could repurchase debt as it
matured or was sold back to the public17. The value of a bond is the net
present value of its coupon payments and its redemption value. If interest
rates are constant, you will need to reinvest all of the coupons so that when
the bond matures you can replace it with an equivalent bond using the re-
demption value plus cumulated coupons (with interest). However, the British
Treasury preferred the payback arrangement as it reduced the size of the cur-
rent government deficit. It should be noted that the whole of the coupon was
16Larry Elliot, “Bank of England to hand over gilts interest payments to slash national
debt”, Guardian 9th November 2012. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/nov/
09/bank-of-england-gilts-interest
17In the same article, Larry Elliot quotes Mervyn King ”While transferring the APF’s net
income to the exchequer will result initially in payments from the APF to the government,
it is likely to lead to the need for reverse payments from the government to the APF in
the future as bank rate increases and the APF’s gilt holdings are unwound by the monetary
policy committee (MPC). Indeed, under reasonable assumptions, it is likely that the majority
of any transfer of funds to the government will eventually need to be reversed.
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not repaid to the Treasury: the Bank of England only paid the coupon after
deducting the interest payments on commercial bank reserves at the central
bank. However, if we consolidate the public sector, the fact that the Treasury
receives this income means that it has to issue less new debt to fund the gov-
ernment debt now, but may have to issue further debt to make up for the loss
incurred by the APF.
The Bank of England has calculated the size of this final bill under several
scenarios. The first was an interactive spreadsheet published on the Bank of
England website in 2013, but subsequently taken down 18, the second a listing
of alternative scenarios put up in 2016. If we assume that nominal interest
rates rise to a new normal of inflation target plus 2%, i.e. 4%, then the Bank
of England’s own figures estimate the end cost to be £60-100bn (scenarios
10 and 14), assuming a 200bp effect on interest rates. The Treasury and the
tax-payer are responsible for this final bill.
If we take the whole history of QE, it has been argued that the Treasury
will have come out a winner: the flow of payments to the Treasury during QE
will have given the Treasury the ability to pay off this final bill with quite a lot
left over. Whilst the final bill might be as much as £60-100bn, the cumulated
revenues will be greater being over £100bn. If we take the the most recent
update provided by the Bank of England.19 The Bank Rate is projected to
increase to 2 percent over a period of 5 years. Stock reduction is assumed to
begin when Bank Rate reaches 2%, following previous MPC judgements, and
proceeds at a pace of £10bn of gilts per quarter. The start of stock reduction
is assumed to have a 400bp impact on gilt yields. Figures are based on data
as at 31st March 2017. These assumptions result in a net gain to the Treasury
of £5.2bn. This is the result of a forecasted £103.3bn rebated from the APF
18The Excel spreadsheet is available from the authors on request.
19https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/quarterly-bulletin/2013/q1/
the-profile-of-cash-between-the-apf-and-hmt
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to the Treasury, and a subsequent £98.1bn returned as QE is unwound.
Since the unwinding of QE will have a major negative impact on public
finances. Perhaps we could just leave the balance bloated balance sheets as
they are indefinitely. There are two problems here. First, if policy rates are
normalized but QE left in place, then the APF will be in a position where the
market value of its assets is less than the book value. It will become insolvent.
This may not be a problem because the Bank of England is the only creditor
of the APF and it can be expected to keep its loan in place. However, the
other problem is the potential for an explosion in the money supply.
QE was often reported in the press as “printing money”: the bonds were
purchased by money created by the Bank. This could have led to a big increase
in the money supply and hence inflation. However, it did not. The reason
for this is that the financial crisis had led to a collapse in commercial bank
lending, lending being the main driver behind creating money (we are talking
about M4, the broad money supply that includes bank deposit accounts). The
“money multiplier” is the process by which the banking system creates money:
deposits are made by firms and households into banks, which are then lent out
again by banks (subject to some reserves held by banks to cover depositor’s
cash needs). The banking system takes a relatively small amount of cash
(plus reserves) and turns it into the broad money supply. In 2006, the size
of the money supply M4 was £1.5 trillion, equal to the size of nominal GDP.
When banks stopped lending (both to each other and to firms and households)
during the financial crisis this created a gap into which the government could
step, buying up its own debt without causing an explosion in M4.
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Figure 4.2: QE and Balances at Bank of England, authors’ calculations
The overall behaviour of the broad money supply is depicted in fig. 4.3.
The left hand axis gives magnitudes in millions. The dotted line is nominal
GDP, which simply serves as a reference value. On the bottom right corner
you can see the same amounts for QE and reserves as were shown in fig. 4.2.
We show the M4 quantity as the grey line, and the blue line is M4 net of QE.
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Figure 4.3: M4 and QE, authors’ calculations
As we can see, although there was a big increase in M4 during the height
of the crisis in 2009 up to a peak in the first quarter of 2011, after that the
level of the money supply fell and remained more or less constant until 2016
during which it has resumed growth. If we net out the money generated by
QE, we can see that since the crisis the money supply has been fairly level at
around its pre-crisis value.
The level and growth of the money supply have not been targeted by
the Bank of England since the monetarist experiment in the 1980s, but are
an essential statistic. The money supply captures the creation of money via
loans within the banking system and also injections from the public sector.
The money supply is increased by the public sector when the fiscal deficit is
not funded by issuing new bonds (a process called monetization), and more
recently by QE.
If the money supply increases at a sustained rate which is significantly
greater than the growth of nominal GDP, this can lead to future inflation,
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both as reflected in CPI (the price of goods and services) and also asset prices.
Even if CPI inflation is not generated, asset price inflation can lead to bubbles
(for example in housing or the stock market) which can, as we have learned,
have adverse consequences.
This means that QE may be storing up problems for the future. If banks
decide to start lending more the money to households and firms, then without
policy changes there could be an explosion in the money supply. This could
happen very quickly. Thankfully, QE can provide its own solution to this
problem. The Bank of England can sell back the bonds it owns in order
to maintain a target ceiling of growth in the money supply. For example,
since inflation is 2% and the real economy is growing at around 2%, nominal
GDP should grow at around 4% per annum. This would indicate that the
annual money supply growth should be kept (for example) to no more than
5% - nominal GDP growth plus 1% (as is clear from fig. 4.3, there is a long-
run trend for M4 growth to exceed nominal GDP growth, reflecting natural
variations in the “velocity of circulation”). The exact “upper bound” or ceiling
for monetary growth would need to be decided by the MPC, the figure of
5% is simply a ball park illustration. The rate at which QE is unwound
will then depend on the behavior of the private sector – essentially bank
lending20. Note that QE may not be completely reversed. It may be that
due to changes in regulations and lessons learned, the money multiplier has
permanently decreased. In that case, part of the QE assets may remain on
the Central Banks balance sheet for a long time (until they naturally mature).
We have discussed the UK scenario for unwinding QE in some detail. The
US case is different in two major ways. simpler. First, the size of FED
bonds held by SOMA are a much smaller percentage of GDP than the Bank
20There is a flow of funds equation determining monetary growth. The three main factors
are monetization by the government (the deficit less net new bonds), new bank lending to
the private sector, and capital inflows.
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of England’s. Also, the US treasury bond market is much larger than the
UK market relative to GDP. US bonds have a much shorter life than UK
bonds: in 2016 the flow of bonds coming to maturity in the US and needing
to be refinanced was 16% of GDP, in the UK just 6.2%. Thus the impact of
unwinding QE on interest rates might be small in the US compared to the
UK. The second difference is the fact that a large part of the SOMA balance
sheet is constituted by MBS. These have an uncertain value (although the Fed
may have an accurate internal valuation). It is hard to make an estimate of
the potential loss (or gain) from the resale of these assets.
In the US the process of unwinding has just started, so it will soon become
clearer what the impact of normalization might be. Long-term interest rates
have indeed been rising: in September 2017 the rate on 10 year treasuries was
2.2%, in May 2018 it was 3.0%.
Name Start End
Total
Spent
($bn)
Assets Bought Notes
QE 1 Nov 08 Mar 09 100 GSE debt
QE 1 Nov 08 Mar 09 500 Agency MBS
QE 1 (extended) Mar 09 Mar 10 750 Agency MBS
QE2 Nov 10 Jun 11 600
Long-term
Treasury bonds
$75bn per month
Operation Twist Sep 11 Jun 12 400
Long-term
Treasury bonds
Sold short-term
treasuries.
QE3 Sep 12 Dec 12 120 * Agency MBS $40bn per month.
QE3 Dec 12 Dec 13 1020 * Agency MBS $85bn per month.
Tapering QE3 Dec 13 Oct 14 320 * Agency MBS
Reduced by
$10bn per month
Table 4.1: QE in the USA. * indicates authors’ calculations.
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4.3 Bank Recapitalization and Nationalization
4.3.1 USA
The USA assisted 976 entities - including the automotive industry. The first
entry in fig. 4.4 reports the real value of total funds dispersed in the form
of loans and purchases under US programs as $668.5bn. On top of this,
a further $29.7bn was made available under the Making Home Affordable
program bringing the total to $698.2bn. These subsidies were not expected to
be returned and we do not include them when calculating returns.
The second entry reports the real value of funds returned under all pro-
grams at $758.1bn, indicating a healthy real profit of $89.6bn. This figure
includes repayments, dividends and interest payments, plus proceeds from
the sale of warrants and provision of loan guarantees. However, proceeds
were revenue for services rendered separate from the recapitalization programs
and should not be included in returns. Excluding investment proceeds, US
programs returned $737.2bn, a real profit of $68.6bn. Figure 4.5 illustrates
the importance of Government-Sponsored Enterprises to the success of the
programs. Excluding GSEs from the analysis and program profits drop to
$18.2bn, and excluding investment proceeds, the program actually made a
loss of $2.7bn. In total, $207.4bn was dispersed to Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, which have since repaid $278.8bn, a profit of $71.4bn – enough to turn
a loss-making program into a profitable one. Figure 4.6 illustrates the time-
line of all programs and the effect of omitting investment proceeds and GSEs
on the final outcome. Figure 4.7 reports the timeline of repayments of both
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
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Figure 4.4: Breakdown of US repayments
Figure 4.5: Breakdown of US repayments, excluding GSEs
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Figure 4.6: USA monthly
Figure 4.7: GSE graph
Finally, fig. 4.8 illustrates recipients who returned more than their ini-
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tial outlay, fig. 4.11, illustrates those who returned less. These figures are
‘cash-in-cash-out’ and include all funds both to and from recipients, including
investment income. As described, GSEs are the main ‘winners’ while Gen-
eral Motors is the main loser. figs. 4.9 and 4.10 report the results excluding
proceeds from insurance guarantees reveal that AIG, Citigroup and GMAC ac-
tually returned less than their investment. The taxpayer took on considerable
risk in providing guarantees to these companies and received fees in return.
Counting these fees as part of the repayment of recapitalization implies that
the companies received loan guarantees for free.
Figure 4.8: Winners $bn
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Figure 4.9: Winners, excluding fees from insurance guarantees $bn
Figure 4.10: Losers, excluding fees from insurance guarantees $bn
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Figure 4.11: Losers $bn
4.3.2 UK
The British program was far smaller, providing recapitalization to only 4
banks21. The British government also provided loans to the deposit insurer
(the Financial Services Compensation Scheme) to provide compensation for 5
troubled banks22. All US stakes have been sold and only the Royal Bank of
Scotland is yet to be returned to private hands, which will crystalize a loss to
the UK taxpayer of £27.4 billion.
Figure 4.12 illustrates the returns to recapitalization in the UK. Even
under the most generous assumption that proceeds ought to be included in
measures of return, the program will make significant losses. As stakes in
RBS are yet to be sold, we cannot exactly calculate the result of the pro-
gram. We make a forecast by assuming the government’s stake in RBS can
be sold at market prices. Table 4.2 reports the losses from each bank as a
21Lloyds and Royal Bank of Scotland, plus the full nationalization of Northern Rock and
Bradford & Bingley.
22Bradford & Bingley, Heritable Bank, Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander Limited, Lands-
banki Islands (Icesave), London Scottish Bank
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result of the recapitalization program both including and excluding proceeds
from insurance guarantees. The first result is that losses due to the Royal
Bank of Scotland account for 99 percent of losses including proceeds or 96
percent of losses without. The second result is Lloyds only turns a profit if
insurance proceeds of £3.2bn in real terms are used to offset losses from the
recapitalization program.
Figure 4.12: Breakdown of UK repayments
Recipient Inc. Proceeds Ex. Proceeds
Royal Bank of Scotland -32,844.66 -34,364.02
Lloyds +1,960.07 -1,278.18
Bradford & Bingley -35.05 -35.05
NRAM -7.41 -7.41
Landsbanki Islands (Icesave) -0.14 -0.14
Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander -0.10 -0.10
London Scottish Bank -0.03 -0.03
Heritable Bank -0.01 -0.01
Table 4.2: Net gains (losses) from the UK recapitalization program, £m
Figure 4.13 presents the timeline of total funds dispersed and returned
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under UK programs which lasted far longer than US programs and are likely
to end in a net-loss to taxpayers. The dotted line indicates projected returns
from a sale of RBS at market value.
Figure 4.13: UK monthly
4.3.3 Return on Investment
Bagehot (1873) suggested central banks should lend freely, guaranteeing a
supply of funds at high rates. The rate should be high to prevent moral hazard;
to encourage interbank lending (Bignon, Flandreau and Ugolini, 2012); and to
protect the central bank from risk. To quantify the conjecture that emergency
action during the crisis could lead to moral hazard in the future, fig. 4.14
compares return on equity for US taxpayers23 to the average real return on
US bank equity during the same period of 7.8 percent, shown in black.
23Calculated as the geometric average of dividends paid to funds invested over the dura-
tion of government intervention.
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Figure 4.14: Real return on bank equity for US participants of bank recapi-
talization programs.
Excluding proceeds, 34 US banks paid above average equity while the re-
maining 746 banks paid below average returns. In the UK, all banks made
losses hence all paid below the average return on bank equity of 0.72 percent.
The striking difference between the two countries is that healthy banks took
funds at high rates (Goldman Sachs, Wells Fargo) while the UK only helped
stricken banks at low rates. Culpepper and Reinke (2014) argue this is due
to differences in relative size of the domestic market such that US regulators
over banks had more bargaining power than their British counterparts. How-
ever, this factor is small compared to the big effect of Government Sponsored
Enterprises (GSEs) for which there is no British equivalent. As of 17/08/12,
the US government receives all profits from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
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leaving its private shareholders out of pocket (case in court, 3rd amendment).
Together these GSEs have returned $71.2bn to the US government.
On average, the US government subsidized failing banks by 4%, halving
their funding costs. This indicates that in a crisis, a bank can reasonably
expect to be able depend on cheap government funding, with adverse im-
plications for future bank conduct. We now provide a theoretical model of
an alternative system where government intervention is credibly ruled out,
narrow banking.
4.4 Theoretical Model
4.4.1 Model
The household is a representative small investors24 with power utility
U(ct) =
c1−γt
1− γ − 1. (4.1)
Households choose consumption, ct, bonds, bt+1 and risky assets, dt+1, to
maximize their continuation value, Vt,
max
ct,bt+1,dt+1
Vt = U(ct) + βEt[Vt+1], (4.2)
subject to the budget constraint
ct + wt+1 = ω + (1 + rb)bt + (1 + rd,t)dt, (4.3)
where ω is the household’s fixed outside income. Household investment in
bonds at t − 1 is bt which each yield safe return rb. Investment in risky
deposits at t − 1 is dt which each return rd,t which is not known at t − 1.
Define allocation to deposits at t as αt+1 ≡ dt+1/(bt+1 + dt+1). Households
choose consumption at t according to the Euler equation
c−γt = βEtc
−γ
t+1 [1 + αt+1rd,t+1 + (1− αt+1)rb] . (4.4)
24Their investment decisions have no effect on returns.
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The quantity of assets to allocate to risky deposits, αt+1, satisfies
0 = EtU
′(ct+1)[r˜d,t+1 − rb]. (4.5)
Following Cochrane (2009) and Wickens (2011), we use a deterministic con-
sumption point to approximate this condition. Specifically, if the household
invests only in safe bonds, αt+1 = 0, her consumption at t+ 1 is
cBt+1 = ω + wt+2[1 + rb]− wt, (4.6)
which does not depend on the realization of risky deposits, r˜d,t+1. Taking a
first-order Taylor expansion of eq. (4.5) about this deterministic consumption
level, cBt+1, yields
0 = U ′(cBt+1)Et(r˜d,t+1 − rb) + Et
[
dt+1(r˜d,t+1 − rb)2U ′(cBt+1)
]
, (4.7)
or
αt+1 =
1
σt
· Etrd,t+1 − rb
V ar(r˜d,t+1) + Et [r˜d,t+1 − rb]2
. (4.8)
where σt is co-officient of relative risk aversion with respect to wealth
σt ≡ −
U ′′(cBt+1)wt+1
U ′(cBt+1)
=
γwt+1
cBt+1
. (4.9)
The share of wealth at risk increases with expected return on deposits, de-
creases with risk aversion and decreases with variance.
The approximation of eq. (4.5) by eq. (4.7) results in lifetime consumption-
smoothing. Investment in risky assets, dt+1, increases with household wealth,
Wt = bt+dt. However, the proportion invested in risky assets, αt+1, decreases
as wealth increases. This is robust to any preference structure with dimin-
ishing marginal utility implying a concave utility function. There is evidence
that poorer households are willing to risk higher proportions of their savings
in Bosch-Dome`nech and Silvestre (2003); Paravisini, Rappoport, and Ravina
(2010); Kuznar (2001); Dillon and Scandizzo (1978); Page, Savage, and Torgler
(2014) and Binswanger (1980).
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Narrow Banking
Narrow banks only invest in safe bonds, bt, and return rb. Wide banks accept
deposits, dt, at t and invest in projects which return r˜k,t+1dt at t + 1. We
assume this return stochastically dominates the return that households receive
if they invest directly in projects.25 The bank sector is competitive so project
returns are passed onto depositors in full
r˜d,t+1 = r˜k,t+1. (4.10)
Project return is subject to aggregate (macroeconomic risk)26 such that bank
return is identical for all banks. For simplicity, we model a one-off shock to
capital return from its steady state, r¯k,
r˜k,t+1 = r¯k − et. (4.11)
Government Guarantees
Without support, competition also ensures that capital losses are also passed
onto depositors. Consider a government policy to prevent negative deposit
returns such that eq. (4.10) is replaced with
r˜d,t+1 = r˜k,t+1 + gt+1, (4.12)
where
gt = max [0,−r˜k,t+1] . (4.13)
This support can be understood as an amalgamation of deposit insurance and
the indemnity of that insurer by the Treasury. In this way, we capture both
the explicit and implicit guarantees of the financial sector.27 By guaranteeing
a floor on deposit returns, the total value of the government subsidy to savers
25This can be motivated using delegated monitoring (Diamond (1984)) or costly state
verification as employed in Townsend (1979); Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).
26As in Diamond (1984), banks pool projects to diversify away from idiosyncratic risk.
27The value of this implicit guarantee is estimated in Noss and Sowerbutts (2012).
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is proportion to risky savings, dt,
st = gtdt. (4.14)
Governments fund this subsidy through foreign borrowing at interest rate, rg.
A proportion δ of this debt is paid off each period through lump-sum taxation,
τt. Government borrowing to fund guarantee payments is
Ft = (1 + rg)Ft−1 − τt−1 + st (4.15)
where
τt = δFt−1. (4.16)
Households take taxation as given and their budget constraint is
ct + wt+1 + τt = ω + (1 + rb)bt + (1 + rd,t)dt. (4.17)
Households may continue to invest in safe bonds, but the effect of the gov-
ernment guarantee is to both increase expected return on risky deposits and
decrease deposit variance. This increases a household’s optimal allocation to
risky assets.
4.4.2 Results
Regressive Wealth Transfer
By eq. (4.14), the government guarantee of deposits induces a transfer pro-
portional to the size of investment in risky deposits at t, dt. This is funded
by lump-sum taxation, τt, levied equally among households. We now consider
households which are heterogeneous in the size of their outside income, ω.
Lump-sum taxation will result in a regressive transfer from low-endowment
households to high-endowment households.
Let there be n households with a continuum of endowments, the vector
ω. We assume the economy begins in equilibrium such that each household
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invests a fixed proportion, Ψ =
(r¯p−rb)
(r¯k−rb){γ(r¯p−rb)−rb} , of her endowment in risky
deposits, d¯i
d¯i = ωiΨ. (4.18)
Let there be a realization of the shock to capital at t = 1 which results in
negative returns, e > r¯k. The government transfer to each saver is equal to
si,1 = gtd¯i = (e− r¯k)ωiΨ. (4.19)
This increases linearly with the endowment, ωi. Meanwhile lumpsum taxa-
tion, τt, is levied equally on all households. We can rewrite the government’s
accumulation of borrowing (eq. (4.15)) as
Ft = (1 + rg)Ft−1 +
n∑
i=1
si,1 − nτt, (4.20)
where each households repays a portion, δ/n, of total debt each period
τt =
δ
n
Ft−1. (4.21)
We assume the shock and transfer only occurs once. Each household pays tax
∞∑
t=1
τt =
δ
n(δ − rg)
n∑
i=1
si,1. (4.22)
The effect of the government guarantee, net of taxation, for each household is
NetTransferi = si,1 −
∞∑
t=1
τt = (e− r¯k)Ψ
[
ωi − δ
δ − rg ω¯
]
, (4.23)
where ω¯ is the mean household endowment. If we assume that the govern-
ment’s real cost of borrowing, rg, is zero,
28 this reduces to
NetTransferi = si,1 −
∞∑
t=1
τt = (e− r¯k)Ψ [ωi − ω¯] . (4.24)
The government policy only benefits households with above-average endow-
ments, at the expense of households with below-average endowments. This
28For example, the government engages in Quantitative Easing to reduce its costs of
funding.
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regressive wealth transfer would only increase if we allow the moral hazard
effect to increase the shock e as government support increases bank risk tak-
ing. Though it is a value judgment, the Pigou-Dalton principle (Dalton (1920)
would argue that such a poor-to-rich transfer is welfare reducing. Such trans-
fers are supported in empirical evidence by Araten and Turner (2013); Ueda
and di Mauro (2013); Schich and Lindh (2012); Baker, McArthur, et al. (2009)
and Noss and Sowerbutts (2012). Calomiris and Jaremski (2016) also argue
that the transfer could also go into bank profits or to subsidizing borrowers.
In this set-up, income and wealth are synonymous and taxation is lump-
sum, which are oversimplifications. As such, this problem could be resolved
using a Pigouvian tax on wealth equal to the value of the transfer, estimated
at $365bn for the years 2007 to 2010 (Tsesmelidakis and Merton (2012). How-
ever, this baulking sum and unpopular taxation could be far more easily re-
solved by simply removing the government subsidization of risk premium for
deposit savers, as under the narrow-wide banking system.
Short Sharp Shocks
We now provide a dynamic illustration of the model. Table 4.3 reports our
calibration. We use a 3rd order perturbation method and make use of the
pruning algorithm by Andreasen, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramı´rez
(2013) to solve the model.
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Parameter Description Value
β Time preference 0.95
γ Risk aversion 2
ω Endowment 1
δ Rate of deficit reduction .05
r¯k Steady state return to capital .07
rb Risk-free rate .01
rg Goverment funding cost 0
σe Shock to capital return .01
Table 4.3: Parameter Values
Figure 4.15 compares narrow banking, the dotted black line, to the sys-
tem with government guarantees, the solid red line. Under narrow banking,
depositors lose money when the one-off shock to rk is realized in period 1.
Consumption falls on impact. Households do not expect further crises and
want to restore their consumption to pre-crisis levels. They achieve this by
investing more of their wealth in the risky assets shown by the sharp increase
in α. Unburdened by taxation, the economy returns quickly to equilibrium,
a short, sharp shock. With the guarantee, depositors do not lose money but
consumption still falls on impact due to the expected taxation burden required
to fund the government transfer. Moreover, the distorting effect of smoothing
losses over several periods leads to reduced incentive to re-invest in risky as-
sets – shown by the markedly slower increase in α. Both the taxation burden
and reduced incentives to invest lead to a much longer recession. This story
can be summed up in the discussion of how best to remove a band-aid.
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Figure 4.15: IRF results comparing slow recovery with government support
to a ‘short sharp shock’ without.
4.5 Conclusion
We have modeled a representative household’s investment decision between
these two assets using portfolio theory (Markowitz (1952). In reality, banks
may choose to model investment accounts on Money Market Mutual Funds,
or have investors hold equity rather than deposits, as suggested by Kotlikoff
(2010); Cochrane (2014). Other possible strategies are for banks to require
notice on withdrawals; use Contingent Convertible bonds (Calomiris and Her-
ring (2011); specialize in particular asset classes; agree emergency interbank
lines of credit or produce high-quality information for investors. The advan-
tage of narrow banking is that it allows the markets to decide on the best
structure for their investment business with reduced regulation and reduced
government guarantee.
We have concerns for ability of regulation to prevent crises. For exam-
ple, the U.K. is attempting to ‘ring-fence’ deposits but as Paul Volker as-
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tutely observed “Ring-fencing... only works in fair-weather”29. Indeed, the
2008-9 experience underlined the difficulties regulators face: Kay et al. (2010)
notes that banks were within their prescribed regulatory limits when the crisis
struck. Regulation requires political will to maintain, especially in the face of
booms, international arbitrage, regulatory capture(Stigler (1971); Laffont and
Tirole (1991)), lobbying budgets and ratings agency grade inflation (Skreta
and Veldkamp (2009b)). As Admati and Hellwig (2013) write instead of pre-
venting failure, “[Bank]... liquidations should be seen as normal occurrences
in a market economy.”
29http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9561624/
Paul-Volcker-ring-fencing-banks-is-not-enough.html
Chapter 5
Conclusion
The availability of governmental insurance – explicit or expected implicitly –
has incentive consequences. Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (1997, 2002) pro-
vide empirical evidence that deposit insurance is associated with an increase
in financial instability. However, the consequences of limiting or removing
deposit insurance are not sufficiently understood. This thesis makes some
progress in answering some common challenges provided by proponents of the
dominant deposit insurance paradigm. In particular, we show that a narrow-
wide banking system can provide liquidity and credit to the economy, with
the shift to improving loan quality over quantity. Moreover, we show that the
costs of supporting banks can be better spent at improving bank transparency
for its investors. Far more is left to be done. In particular, the consequences
of connecting bank savers directly to bank risk should be considered carefully.
Fears of an increase in macroeconomic volatility are widespread and must be
answered satisfactorily. Furthermore, the practicalities of providing sufficient
and accurate information so that non-expert savers can distinguish good in-
vestments from bad explored in Kaufman, Benston, Eisenbeis, Horvitz, and
Kane (1986) continue to provide challenges for future work.
The current system promotes moral hazard and distorts incentives by pro-
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viding public insurance to a private liability. It is not a free-market solution.
It is important to note that in the US, deposit insurance was enacted with
the Glass-Steagall provisions that completely separated investment from retail
banking (Alper (1933)). As subsequent decades have shown, strong regulation
requires political will to maintain – especially in the face of booms, interna-
tional arbitrage, lobbying, and regulatory capture (Laffont and Tirole (1991)).
Moreover, regulating an industry whose complexities are constantly evolving
is difficult. A prime example is the fact that banks were well within their
prescribed regulatory limits in 2008 when the crisis struck (Kay et al. (2010)).
Policies which re-instate market discipline on the financial sector are deserv-
ing of the increased academic attention they are receiving, as in Acharya and
Thakor (2015) and Calomiris, Flandreau, and Laeven (2016).
Appendix A
Appendices for Chapter 2
A.1 Proofs
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
For some values of leverage, γ, the effort choice that is profit-maximizing
becomes apparent since the banker will either always get a return in the default
state or it will never get a return in the default state, independent of whether
it monitors at al = 0 or ah. For example, suppose the bank’s choice of leverage
(deposits) is sufficiently low such that γ < γlow where
(γlow + k)d(a = 0) = γlowRC/℘ (A.1)
or
γlow =
kRL(1− α)
RC/℘−RL(1− α) (A.2)
Since in this case deposits are default-free even if the bank made no effort,
bank equity receives the entire benefit from effort. Consequently, given the
parametric restriction in (2.2), the profit-maximizing choice of effort is ah and
RD = RC/℘. For this case of γ < γ
low, the bank’s expected profit is (2.10).
In contrast, suppose that the bank’s choice of leverage is very high such that
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γ > γhigh where
(γhigh + k)d(ah) = γhighRC/℘ (A.3)
γhigh = k
βpbRL − c
c− βpb(RL −RC/℘) (A.4)
In this case even if effort was at the first-best level ah, bank equity would
receive none of the benefit from monitoring effort. Therefore, because effort
is not contractible, the profit-maximizing effort level is al = 0 and RD =
RR−pb γ+kγ d(al)
pg
=
RR−pb γ+kγ RL(1−α)
pg
. For this case of γ > γhigh, the bank’s
expected profit is (2.6).
Now for γlow < γ < γhigh, we can determine whether effort al = 0 or ah
given in (2.8) is chosen by comparing the difference in the bank’s expected
profits under these two choices. Hence, for a bank’s given choice of γ and
depositors’ given choice of RD, the difference in the bank’s expected profits
from effort level ah versus al is
pb max[(γ+k)d(a
h)−γRD, 0]−cah(γ+k)−pb max[(γ+k)d(al)−γRD, 0] (A.5)
Now note that since d(al) = RL(1− α) < RC/℘ ≤ RD, we have
(γ + k)d(al)− γRD = kRL(1− α)− γ (RD −RL(1− α)) (A.6)
which is always negative for γ > γlow. Using this result and substituting in
for ah, the difference in expected profit becomes
pb max
[
(γ + k)
[
RL − c
βpb
]
− γRD, 0
]
− c(γ + k)
β
ln
(
βαpbRL
c
)
(A.7)
The rise in expected profit from effort in (A.7) is weakly decreasing in RD.
Moreover, for any γ ≤ γhigh, deposits are default-free when the bank chooses
the first-best effort level ah. Therefore, for γ ≤ γhigh, a rational expectations
equilibrium in which a bank supplies first-best effort obtains if and only if
pb
(
(γ + k)
[
RL − c
βpb
]
− γRC/℘
)
− c(γ + k)
β
ln
(
βαpbRL
c
)
> 0. (A.8)
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Re-writing this condition in terms of first-best effort, ah,
pb
[
(γ + k)d(ah)− γRC/℘
]
− (γ + k)cah > 0, (A.9)
we can define the threshold leverage γm for which this condition binds as
γm = k
pbd(a
h)− cah
pbRC/℘− [pbd(ah)− cah] . (A.10)
A.1.2 Proof that high effort profits are decreasing in cost
pih = (γm + k)
[
pgRL + pbd(a
h)− ciah
]
− γmRC (A.11)
Define Ψ ≡ pbd(ah)− ciah so that γm = k ΨpbRC/℘−Ψ .
pih =
(
k
Ψ
pbRC/℘−Ψ + k
)
[pgRL + Ψ]− k Ψ
pbRC/℘−ΨRC (A.12)
=kpgRC/℘
pbRL −Ψ
pbRC/℘−Ψ
∂pih
∂Ψ
=kpgRC
pb[RL −RC/℘]
{pbRC −Ψ/℘}2
> 0 (A.13)
We then use ∂d(a
h)
∂ci
= − 1βpb and ∂a
h
∂ci
= − 1ciβ to show that
∂Ψ
∂ci
=pb
∂d(ah)
∂ci
− ah − ci∂a
h
∂ci
= −ah < 0. (A.14)
Hence ∂pi
h
∂ci
= ∂pi
h
∂Ψ
∂Ψ
∂ci
< 0.
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1
To prove Proposition 1, we start by showing that there is a unique value of ci
that equates pil to pih. Equating (2.11) to (2.12), one obtains equation (2.14)
that can be re-written as
F (ci) ≡ ci
(
1
β
+ ah(ci)
)
=
pilpb(RL −RC/℘)
pil − pgkRC/℘ (A.15)
where ah(ci) =
1
β ln
(
βαpbRL
ci
)
. Now note that
∂F (ci)
∂ci
= ah(ci) > 0 (A.16)
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Consequently, the left-hand-side of equation (A.15) is an increasing function of
ci. Given that the right-hand-side of (A.15) is independent of ci and condition
(2.13) holds, there is a unique value ci for which the left-hand-side of (A.15)
equals the right-hand-side of (A.15). This is equivalent to there existing a
single critical value of ci = c
∗ such pil = pih(c∗), and values of ci below c∗ imply
pil < pih(ci) while values of ci above c
∗ imply pil > pih(ci). Therefore, given
Lemma 1, the value c∗ in (2.14) is the cut-off between choosing high effort,
limited leverage, and quasi-safe deposits versus choosing no effort, maximum
leverage, and risky deposits.
A.1.4 Proof of Lowest-cost bank leverage limit
Least cost banks can limit total deposits to a maximum of γmDI,L > γ
r while
still having an incentive to provide high effort. These banks issue insured
deposits up to the limit γr at a funding cost of (1 + φh)RF = RF /℘ per
deposit. On top of this, they issue uninsured deposits equal to γmDI,L − γr
which promise to return RC/℘. Compared to eq. (A.9), the condition for
which high effort binds is now
pb
[
(γ + k)d(ah)− (γ − γr)RC/℘− γrRF /℘
]
− (γ + k)cah > 0, (A.17)
Solving for γ, we obtain
γmDI,L =
pbγ
r(RC −RF )/℘+ k[pbd(ah)− cah]
pbRC/℘− [pbd(ah)− cah] . (A.18)
A.1.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Recall that cT is the cost of effort such that a bank is indifferent between
no effort and high effort when there is no deposit insurance and no effort
banks can tranche their deposits. In other words, pihT
(
cT
)
= pilT . If with
deposit insurance, this bank’s increase in profits is greater by choosing no
effort compared to choosing high effort, then it will unambiguously choose no
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effort. In that case, the cost at which a bank is indifferent between no effort
and high effort must be less; that is, cDI < cT .
Now note that from equation (2.31), the increase in profit from no effort
after deposit insurance is independent of cost and can be written as
pilDI − pilT = (γr − γs) (RR −RC) + γr (RC −RF ) (A.19)
For the bank with cost ci = c
T , equation (2.39) shows that the corresponding
increase in profit from high effort after deposit insurance is(
pihDI,M − pihT
)
|ci=cT =
(
γmDI,M − γm
) [
pgRL + pbd
(
ah
(
cT
))− cTah (cT )−RF ]+γm (RC −RF )
(A.20)
where ah
(
cT
)
= 1β ln
(
βαpbRL/c
T
)
. The difference in this increase in profit
from no effort versus high effort is
pilDI − pilT −
(
pihDI,L − pihT
)
|ci=cT = (γr − γs) (RR −RC) + (γr − γm) (RC −RF ) (A.21)
− (γmDI,M − γm) [pgRL + pbd(ah (cT ))− cTah (cT )−RF ]
The first line of equation (A.21) includes two terms that are both positive
and increasing in γr. The second line of equation (A.21) is negative and
independent of γr. Thus, the higher is γr, the greater is profit difference. The
threshold value of γr at which pilDI − pilT −
(
pihDI,L − pihT
)
|ci=cT = 0 is then
γr∗ =
(
γmDI,M − γm
) [
pgRL + pbd
(
ah
(
cT
))− cTah (cT )−RF ]+ γs (RR −RC) + γm (RC −RF )
RR −RF
(A.22)
A.2 Deposit insurance solution
Recall that the tax-limit on insured deposits is γr and that banks with cost
below cDI will exert effort. Least-cost banks are the subset of high-effort
banks with costs below cm whose low costs puts their leverage limit above the
insurance limit, γm > γr. These banks issue uninsured quasi-safe deposits of
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γm − γr. Moderate cost banks are the subset of high-effort banks with costs
between cm and cDI who restrict their leverage, γm < γr, such that they only
issue insured deposits.
The threshold between the two types of high-effort banks, cm, is the im-
plicit solution to γmDI,M (c
m) = γr. This solution exists if γr ∈
(
γmDI,M (c¯), γ
m
DI,M (c)
)
.
If the insurance restriction is high such that banks with lowest possible costs
are still able to issue within this limit, γr > γmDI,M (c) then least cost banks
do not exist and cm = c. If γr is low such that high-effort banks are able to
offer leverage above this restriction even at the highest cost, γr < γmDI,L(c
DI),
then moderate cost banks do not exist and cm = cDI . Further, if cDI = c
then no banks choose to exert effort.
We consider all three cases when simulating over the parameter space,
creating potentially three solutions for {γR, cDI}. However, our calibration
assumes a tax-base large enough to support high levels of γr seen in the data.
This rules out least-cost banks hence our solution for deposit insurance reflects
the case where only moderate cost banks exist.
We assume a uniform distribution throughout.
1. Start with initial guesses of cDI0 ∈ (c, c¯) and γr0 ∈
(
γmDI,M (c¯), γ
m
DI,M (c)
)
to ensure both least-cost and moderate banks exist.
2. Compute cm as the implicit solution to γmDI,M (c
m) = γr0 .
3. Compute the insurance limit γr = 1
cm−c+c¯−cDI0
[
t¯ω(c¯−c)
RF
− ∫ cDI0cm γmDI,M (ci)dci].
4. Check that γr > γs which ensures that insured banks do not issue unin-
sured, junior deposits.
5. Check that γr ∈
(
γmDI,M (c¯), γ
m
DI,M (c)
)
to be consistent with the as-
sumption that both moderate and least cost banks exist. Check that
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pihDI,M (c) ≤ pilDI(γr) ≤ pihDI,M (c) so that cDI exists.
6. Compute the threshold cDI as the implicit solution to pihDI,M (c
DI) =
pilDI(γ
r).
7. Check that cDI ≥ cm to verify that moderate cost banks exist.
8. Minimize sum of squared difference between solutions to cDI and γr and
their initial guesses.
Repeat step 1 with γr0 ∈ (γmDI,M (c), 1) for the case where least-cost banks do
not exist and γr = 1
c¯−cDI0
[
t¯ω(c¯−c)
RF
− ∫ cDI0c γmDI,M (ci)dci]. Restrict solutions (if
any) to be in (γmDI,M (c), 1).
If moderate cost banks do not exist, then γr = tωRF = γ
n as all banks
insure up to the limit. Provided γr ∈ (0, γmDI,L(c¯)) and this solution is possible,
compute steps 4 and 5 using least-cost profits pihDI,L instead of pi
h
DI,M .
A.3 Welfare Measures
Government intervention produces safe assets equal to γn under both deposit
insurance and narrow banking. Aggregate production of quasi-safe assets un-
der each regime is
ScT =
1
c¯− c
[∫ cT
c
γm(ci)dci + γ
s(c¯− cT )
]
, (A.23)
ScDI =
1
c¯− c
[∫ cm
c
γmDI,L(ci)dci − γr(cm − c)
]
, (A.24)
ScNB,I =
1
c¯− c
[∫ cn
c
min [γm(ci), γ
d]dci + γ
s
NB(c¯− cn)
]
, (A.25)
ScNB,R =S
c
T , (A.26)
where the limits on tranching are given by γs = (γ+k)RL(1−α)RC/℘ and γ
s
NB =
(γd+k)RL(1−α)
RC/℘
. Under narrow banking without the rebate, maximum leverage
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is γd = 1− γn. The surplus from issuing quasi-safe assets for regime r is
SurplusSr = (RR −RC)Scr . (A.27)
No-effort banks issue default-risky junior deposits equal to
RT =
c¯− cT
c¯− c (1− γ
s), (A.28)
RDI =
c¯− cDI
c¯− c (1− γ
r), (A.29)
RNB,I =
c¯− cNB
c¯− c (γ
n − γsNB), (A.30)
RNB,R =RT . (A.31)
The quantity of loans provided by the banking industry is equal to total lia-
bilities, except for narrow banks who do not extend loans
LT =k + S
c
T +RT , (A.32)
LDI =k + γ
n + ScDI +RDI , (A.33)
LNB,I =k + S
c
NB,I +RNB,I , (A.34)
LNB,R =k + S
c
NB,R +RNB,R = LT . (A.35)
As only first-best banks exert effort, total monitoring effort is
A(c∗) =
1
c¯− c
∫ c∗r
c
ahdci, (A.36)
where c∗r is the threshold cost above which banks do not exert effort in each of
the regimes {cT , cDI , cn, cT }. Based on previous logic, we have effort A(cn) >
A(cT ) > A(cDI). Total expected bank profit is given by
ΠT =
1
c¯− c
[∫ cT
c
pih(ci)d(ci) + (c¯− cT )pilT
]
, (A.37)
ΠDI =
1
c¯− c
[∫ cm
c
pihDI,L(ci)d(ci) +
∫ cDI
cm
pihDI,M (ci)d(ci) + (c¯− cDI)pilDI
]
,
(A.38)
ΠNB,I =
1
c¯− c
[∫ cn
c
pih(ci)d(ci) + (c¯− cn)pilNB,I
]
, (A.39)
ΠNB,R =ΠT . (A.40)
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Loan surplus is
SurplusLT =ΠT − SurplusST , (A.41)
SurplusLDI =ΠDI − SurplusSDI − (RR −RF )SfDI , (A.42)
SurplusLNB,I =ΠNB,I − SurplusSNB,I , (A.43)
SurplusLNB,R =ΠNB,R − SurplusSNB,R = SurplusLT . (A.44)
Appendix B
Appendices for Chapter 3
B.1 Deriving Sectoral Returns
Recall that returns to investment in both sectors are given by
rf,t+1 =θZfK
θ−1
f,t+1L
1−θ
f,t+1,
rb,t+1 =(1−ms,t+1)θZbKθ−1b,t+1L1−θb,t+1,
and capital allocation is
Kb,t+1 =αs,tAt+1,
Kf,t+1 =(1− αs,t)At+1.
Both the malfeasance share at t + 1 and optimal allocation to banking, αs,t,
depend on the malfeasance share at t, denoted by subscript s ∈ {L,H}. Let
superscript S ∈ {L,H} denote the realization at t+1 of the mean malfeasance
share, m¯s ∈ {m¯L, m¯H}. After substituting for capital, returns in each sector
conditional on the state realized at t+ 1 are
rSf,t+1 =θZf (1− αs,t)θ−1(At+1)θ−1(LSf,t+1)1−θ, (B.1)
rSb,t+1 =θ(1−ms,t+1)Zb(αs,t)θ−1(At+1)θ−1(LSb,t+1)1−θ. (B.2)
133
134
Labor supply in each industry, conditional on the realized state of the world,
s, is
LSf,t+1 =
Z
1
θ
f (1− αs,t)
ZSt+1
, (B.3)
LSb,t+1 =
[(1−ms,t+1)Zb]
1
θ αs,t
ZSt+1
. (B.4)
where we define the average productivity in the two sectors conditional on the
realization of state S at t+1 as
ZSt+1 = (1− αs,t)Z
1
θ
f + αs,t [(1− m¯S − t+1)Zb]
1
θ . (B.5)
Substituting eq. (B.5) into conditional returns, eqs. (B.1) and (B.2) yields
rSf,t+1(αs,t, t+1) =θ
[
At+1Z
S
t+1
]θ−1
Z
1
θ
f , (B.6)
rSb,t+1(αs,t, t+1) =θ
[
At+1Z
S
t+1
]θ−1
[(1− m¯S − t+1)Zb]
1
θ . (B.7)
These returns depend on the malfeasance share - both its mean state m¯S and
t+1 - and on the aggregate allocation to banking, αs,t.
B.2 Solving for Allocation Decision with Private
Monitoring.
The following steps were used to solve for allocation decisions with private
monitoring.
1. Informed individuals begin by guessing the uninformed optimal alloca-
tion, αU,s,t.
2. Use eqs. (3.30) and (3.31) to calculate optimal informed allocation, αI,s,t,
for any realization of t+1 in the support [a, b]. That is, we construct
αI,s,t(t+1).
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3. Use this function to compute aggregate allocation α¯s,t(t+1), given by
eq. (3.30).
4. The first order condition, eq. (3.32), gives optimal uninformed allocation,
αU,s,t.
5. Iterate until the initial guess for optimal uninformed allocation matches
the solution, yielding αU,s,t and αI,s,t(t+1).
Repeating steps 1-5 over a range of values for nt, and substituting into
eq. (3.33) allows us to find the optimal nt to maximize expected utility.
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